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Abstract 
The present study is the first qualitative investigation of the experiences of 
closeness in romantic relationships for individuals diagnosed with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and their partners.  Eight participants in long term 
relationships, four of whom had been diagnosed with ASD, four of whom had 
partners with a diagnosis, were interviewed regarding their understandings and 
experiences of closeness in the context of their relationships.  Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis was chosen as the method of analysis.  Three 
dominant themes emerged: closeness as authenticity, discovering the partner, 
and autism as an essential difference.  These themes were present in all 
participants’ accounts.  Subordinate themes revealed distinctions in the 
experiences of participants with and without a diagnosis, but, overall, 
commonalities were as significant as differences.  The experience of closeness 
required that the partner felt able to express freely his or her “authentic” self 
through his or her actions, in the confidence that these would be understood, 
accepted, and responded to by the partner in a congruent fashion.  Participants’ 
understandings of ASD, as well as their partners’, were integral to their 
experiences of closeness; within the diverse accounts gathered, autism 
presented both obstacles to, and opportunities for, the experience of closeness.  
The findings resonate with some aspects of dominant models of autism and 
closeness, but problematise others, and demonstrate the distinct contribution that 
qualitative research can make to the understanding of these constructs and their 
relationship to each other.  Consideration is given to the implications of the 
findings for clinical work with people in relationships where one partner has a 
diagnosis of ASD, and to potential directions for future research.  
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“If you ever get close to a human being, 
You’d better be ready to get confused. 
There’s definitely, definitely, definitely no logic 
To human beings.” 
 
- Björk, “Human Behaviour” 
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1. Introduction 
Within this chapter, a review is given of existing literature relevant to the 
understanding of “closeness” in the context of autism, highlighting significant 
limitations of existing research on this topic.  A rationale is provided for the 
adoption of a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation in the present study.  
Consideration is also given to pertinent conceptual issues. 
 
1.1 On Autism 
Autism: a label that suggests by its very etymological roots that the individuals to 
whom it is affixed are closed off from and to others, living within self-contained 
worlds in which other people, as conscious beings, are ignored, marginal, or 
altogether absent (Biklen, 2005).  The world of the autistic individual is likewise 
given as indecipherable to the other.  This putative intersubjective gulf has given 
rise to the representation of the autistic individual within much clinical literature, 
as well as in popular cultural representations, as a fascinating enigma, and 
autism as a phenomenon to be observed, in order that the difference of the 
autistic individual be explained. Since the inception of the diagnostic construct, 
an abundant body of empirical research has accumulated on the topic of the 
interpersonal features of autism, and a series of complex hypotheses advanced 
to account for the differences witnessed in the autistic individual (see Bowler, 
2007).  Comparatively little work has sought to understand the lived 
intersubjective experiences of people who have been given the diagnosis, or of 
others in dyadic relationships with them.   
 
The construct of closeness, with its connotations of deep connection between 
individuals developed through the sharing of aspects of the self kept most 
private, stands as particularly problematic in juxtaposition to a condition of which 
the central intersubjective feature would appear to be distance.  Yet, it is clear 
that, despite the interpersonal difficulties that must, by definition, exist for people 
designated as autistic, for many, the experience of others, of the Other, is a 
central focus of their engagement in the world.  Moreover, autistic persons may 
also occupy the role of “significant other” in other individual’s lives, be they 
autistic or “neurotypical” (a recently developed term for an individual not affected 
by autism – see Sinclair, 1998).  Intersubjectivity cannot, therefore, be reduced in 
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the context of autism to absence; research cannot rest at determining what is 
“missing” for autistic individuals and those in relation to them.  Rather, the 
question is raised as to how intersubjectivity exists substantively in the context of 
autism – what significance does the Other hold for the autistic individual, and he 
for her?   
 
1.2 Literature Review Strategy 
A literature review was conducted in the planning of the present study.  In August 
2011, searches were conducted using the PsycInfo and PsycArticles academic 
databases.  In reviewing current approaches to autism, searches were 
conducted using the keyword combinations “autism AND social”, “autism AND 
romantic AND relationships”, and “autism AND phenomenology”; due to the 
abundance of literature, the search was restricted to publications from 1991 
onwards.  Regarding intimacy and closeness research, searches were 
conducted using the keywords “intimacy” and “closeness”, and the keyword 
combination “intimacy AND phenomenology”; the search covered publications 
from 1981 onwards.  Publication abstracts were read where the title suggested a 
paper to be of interest to the present study; where the abstract demonstrated the 
paper to be of direct relevance, the full publication was reviewed.  Google 
Scholar was used selectively to identify publications citing papers gathered 
through the literature review.  Finally, books pertaining to these subjects were 
reviewed at the UEL and Senate House libraries, as well as at the British Library. 
 
1.3 Autism and Intersubjectivity 
1.3.1 Autism 
Autism is a diagnostic psychiatric construct signifying a set of deficits shown by 
individuals affected by a range of developmental conditions collectively 
designated as Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD).  The diagnostic category 
includes disorders familiar to most clinicians and many lay individuals, such as 
Autistic Disorder (henceforth “Autism”) and Asperger Syndrome (or "Asperger's 
Disorder"), as well as less common diagnoses such as Childhood Disintegrative 
Disorder.  While within DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
these conditions are classified as "Pervasive Developmental Disorders", it has 
been proposed that in the forthcoming DSM-V, the more common nomenclature 
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of "Autism Spectrum Disorder" be formally adopted (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2011). 
 
The core "autistic" features common to each of the separate diagnoses have, 
following Wing (1993), become widely termed the "triad of impairments".  The 
triad includes significant difficulties in interpersonal relationships, impairment in 
communication, and a deficit in imagination.  Individuals who have been formally 
diagnosed according to DSM-IV-TR criteria with Autistic Disorder or Asperger's 
Disorder must have shown at the time of assessment pervasive and enduring 
"qualitative impairment in social interaction" and "restricted, repetitive, and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interest, and activities".  Finally, a diagnosis of 
Autistic Disorder requires that the individual show a marked impairment in 
communication, including developmental delay of speech.  Although a delay in 
language acquisition rules out a diagnosis of Asperger's Disorder, unusual verbal 
communication styles are often shown by people with this diagnosis (Attwood, 
2006). 
 
Of the features of autism, it is the marked qualitative differences in the ways in 
which autistic individuals relate to others which have received the most attention 
in research, and which lie at the core of the rationale for the present study.   
 
1.3.2 Conceptualisations of Autistic Intersubjectivity 
The predominant paradigms within contemporary research seeking to account 
for autistic difference are neuroscientific and cognitive.  As the present research 
is focused on lived experience, the review of existing literature will be restricted 
to theories of the psychological differences in autism that are held to have a 
direct association with the intersubjective features of the diagnosis.  
Neuroscience certainly has a contribution to make to the study of experience 
(Ratcliffe, 2006).  However, neuroscientific research in relation to autism is 
intimately tied with cognitive modelling, such that any phenomenological 
consideration of neuroscientific findings will be mediated by cognitive accounts of 
autism.  Therefore, due to restrictions of space, neuroscientific literature will not 
be reviewed here.   
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1.3.2.1 The Mindblindness Hypothesis 
Of the cognitive accounts of the interpersonal features of autism, the most 
influential has been Simon Baron-Cohen’s (1997) "mindblindness" hypothesis.  
The theory suggests that at the core of autism is a profound impairment in the 
understanding of human behaviour in terms of mental states, such as cognitions 
and emotions.  Baron-Cohen’s first substantive theory of autistic interpersonal 
impairments was based on a number of experimental findings, detailed below, 
made during the eighties and nineties which suggested that autistic children 
showed a specific impairment relative to other groups of similar intellectual ability 
in understanding epistemological states and emotional displays in others.   
 
The most widely cited of the relevant studies concern the ability of autistic 
children to show an understanding of false beliefs in themselves and others.  In 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith’s (1985) ground-breaking study, autistic children 
and controls matched for mental age were presented with a vignette in which one 
doll, ‘Sally’ hid a marble under one of two cups before leaving the scene; during 
Sally’s absence, another doll, ‘Anne’, moved the marble to the other cup.  
Participants were asked upon Sally’s ‘return’ where she would look for the 
marble (the ‘Sally-Anne Task’).  Autistic children were significantly more likely 
than controls to indicate that Sally would proceed straight to the cup where the 
marble had been relocated.  In an equally impressive study, Perner, Frith, Leslie 
and Leekam (1989) found that autistic children showed significant difficulties 
relative to controls in retrospectively recalling false beliefs they themselves had 
explicitly declared before being corrected. 
 
Evidence is also presented to suggest that autistic individuals furthermore show 
impairments in recognising affective states in others.  For example, Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, and Joliffe (1997) found that, when presented with 
photographs of emotional facial expressions, adults with Autism or Asperger 
Syndrome were markedly impaired relative to controls in recognising complex 
emotions such as guilt or mistrust. 
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Baron-Cohen (1997) relates these apparent deficits in social cognition to 
Dennett’s (1987) concept of the “intentional stance”.  Briefly put, Dennett (1987) 
argues that, when faced with the task of understanding and responding to human 
behaviour, the most effective stance for an organism to adopt is to view others’ 
behaviour as intentional, in the sense of being guided by a person’s goals or 
desires in relation to the person’s mental representation of their environment.  
The intentional stance confers substantial advantages upon an individual seeking 
to anticipate others’ actions, particularly in terms of accounting for human error 
and predicting others’ responses to events.  To adopt the intentional stance 
requires that the individual holds a concept of mentalistic structures – that is, that 
he possesses a “theory of mind.”  Within the literature, this “theory” is not a set of 
explicit declarative hypotheses.  Rather, it is envisaged as the product of an 
automatic, preconscious hypothetico-deductive cognitive process (Gopnik, 
1993).  Dennett (1978) suggests that the best marker of a theory of mind is the 
ability to recognise false beliefs.   
 
Baron-Cohen (1997) argues that the aforementioned studies show that autism 
involves a basic impairment in the development of the individual’s theory of mind, 
such that the person is left in a state of “mindblindness”, largely unable to 
understand matters of desire, belief, expectation and error which make up the 
fabric of social interactions.  Her ability to engage effectively with others through 
anticipating others’ perspectives and adjusting her own behaviour accordingly 
will, therefore, be profoundly affected, and social interactions are likely to be 
riddled with confusion, both for herself and others.  The difficulties experienced 
by autistic individuals in communication and reciprocal relationships are 
unsurprising consequences. 
 
The mindblindness hypothesis has proven immensely influential both in 
theoretical models of autism and in clinical work.  Ozonoff and Miller (1995), for 
example, detail an effective programme for “teaching theory of mind” for autistic 
children.  The link made by Baron-Cohen and others between autism and the 
construct of a theory of mind has also been a boon to research on the latter, with 
autistic divergences from control groups’ performances illuminating, by way of 
contrast, important aspects of typical social cognition.   
 6 
 
 
1.3.2.2 Empathising and the Extreme Male Brain Hypothesis 
Baron-Cohen (2002; 2003) expands on his account of autism by suggesting that 
the social deficits affecting autistic individuals are attributable to profound 
impairments in affective empathy.  “Affective empathy” is defined as the adoption 
by an individual of an “appropriate” affective stance in response to another’s 
emotional state – for example, automatically showing concern when another is in 
pain, or showing caution when approaching someone who appears angry.  It is, 
as such, a reciprocal interactive process, reliant upon, but reaching beyond, the 
more detached cognitive processes facilitated by the theory of mind; the 
interpersonal challenge faced by the autistic individual is thus not one simply of 
comprehension, but, moreover, of attunement.  Baron-Cohen (2003) is not 
suggesting that people with autism are indifferent to others’ feelings – many, he 
notes, are very distressed if they discover they have upset someone – but rather 
that there is a lack of spontaneous affective reciprocity.   
 
Baron-Cohen (2002) has suggested that individuals’ levels of affective empathy 
can be located along a continuum, with autism located at the lower extreme.  
Research has, accordingly, sought to quantify empathy in order to support this 
argument.  Baron-Cohen’s research team have developed the “Empathy 
Quotient” (EQ) (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen,& David, 2004), a self-
report measure for assessing an individual’s level of empathy.  The EQ was 
partially validated through showing that it reliably distinguished adults diagnosed 
with ASD from control groups.   
 
Baron-Cohen has also suggested that “systemizing”, a drive to analyse or 
construct systems in order to predict or control their behaviour, may represent 
the process underlying repetitive and ritualistic behaviours as well as engrossing 
special interests engaged in by people with autism.  Further to the EQ, his team 
have developed and validated a “Systemizing Quotient” (SQ) (Baron-Cohen, 
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan,& Wheelwright, 2003) to measure individuals’ 
levels of systemizing; as with the EQ, the SQ has been found to reliably 
distinguish adults with ASD from controls. 
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An interesting feature of both measures is that they not only discriminate 
between autistic and control groups, but that they also reveal significant 
differences between the sexes – women tend to gain higher scores on the EQ, 
men on the SQ.  Baron-Cohen (2003) suggests that these differences 
correspond to the generally greater orientation of women towards social affairs, 
and men towards practical tasks.1  Considering these results, as well as 
developmental differences between the sexes in language and creative play, 
autism has been dubbed by Baron-Cohen (2003, p.133) as a form of the 
“extreme male brain”.   
 
The hypothesis holds points of interest for the present study.  First, it provides a 
framework within which the features of autism are placed on a continuum with 
“normal” functioning, which is in line with evidence suggesting that autism 
represents the extreme end of a distribution of traits that exist within the general 
population (e.g. Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, Childress,& Arndt, 1997).  Second, the 
introduction of the construct of affective empathy appears to bring the account of 
autism somewhat closer to the experiential world, in which we not only 
comprehend others’ behaviour but also intuitively respond to and invest 
ourselves in social relationships.   
 
The evaluation of Baron-Cohen’s (2002) interpretation of autism in terms of 
gender constructs is complex.  Anticipating social constructionist arguments 
against his hypothesis, Baron-Cohen cites intriguing studies that show significant 
intersubjective behavioural differences between day old infants of either sex (e.g. 
Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Ba'tki, & Ahluwalia, 2001).  Nonetheless, 
the interpretation of such evidence in terms of predisposition towards differences 
in empathy and systemizing is contentious.  It will most likely not surprise the 
reader that the “extreme male brain” hypothesis has proven controversial, and 
neuroscientist Cordelia Fine (2011) has offered a robust response offering a 
broader review of the pertinent literature than offered by Baron-Cohen, arguing 
that the evidence for essential differences in empathising ability is insufficient 
and contradictory.   
                                            
1	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  has	  been	  at	  pains	  to	  emphasise	  that	  the	  gender	  differences	  he	  
attempts	  to	  demonstrate	  appear	  only	  at	  a	  cohort	  level,	  with	  large	  variations	  within	  gender	  groups.	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Even if some differences in intersubjective behaviour between the sexes were to 
be accepted as influenced by biology, Baron-Cohen’s (2002) account reductively 
constructs the intersubjective in purely intra-subjective terms, when, in fact, the 
research from which he makes his argument raises profound questions about the 
interface between biological sex and gender as a social construct.  Autism is 
both a diagnosis which is overwhelmingly assigned to men, and is also a 
construct whose features resonate deeply with contemporary ideas of 
masculinity (Murray, 2008).  While Baron-Cohen (2002) infers this as rooted in 
real biological underpinnings of cultural conceptions of gender, it has also been 
argued that the gendered construction of the diagnosis leads to an under 
recognition of autistic features in women, which in turn reinforces the image of 
autism as an essentially masculine condition (Ensum, 2012). Beyond the 
question of the origins of the gendered nature of the construct, the question is 
also posed as to how gender identity is constructed and performed in the context 
of the diagnosis.  In the context of the current research, questions may be asked 
in particular as to how women who accrue an autistic identity navigate the matrix 
of cultural constructions of their gender in the context of romantic relationships. 
 
In addition to the deep issues posed by Baron-Cohen’s (2002) linking of autism 
to gender, the question is also posed as to whether affective empathy is a 
construct sufficiently broad to account for differences in autistic intersubjectivity.  
The image one gains from the clinical portrait of autism is not so much of one 
lacking in empathy, but, more fundamentally, of one removed from concern with 
others’ experiences; it is this aspect of autistic relationality that has been 
addressed by Peter Hobson, whose account of autism will be covered next. 
 
1.3.2.3 Hobson on “Being Moved” 
Central to most approaches to autism is the notion that the interpersonal 
challenges faced by autistic individuals can traced to the opacity of others’ minds 
to them – a fundamental deficit in discerning, comprehending, and responding to 
mentalistic phenomena (Baron-Cohen, 1997).  This focus on the autistic person’s 
comprehension of mental states may be attributable in part to the dominance of 
the cognitive paradigm within psychological research in recent decades.  Peter 
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Hobson (1993, 2002), in contrast, has approached autism from a psychoanalytic 
background, and has, accordingly, developed a very different conceptualisation 
of autistic intersubjectivity. 
 
Hobson (2002) notes that, prior to showing delays in verbal communication and 
complex social cognition, children who are later diagnosed as autistic often show 
distinct differences from other children in more fundamental modes of interaction 
with others.  Hobson argues for the significance in understanding autism of 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979).  The former signifies 
the way in which most infants engage from birth in smooth, immediate 
interpersonal interactions, the latter a developmental shift from around nine 
months in which infants will engage in triangulated interactions with others 
involving shared, affectively charged attention to objects in the surrounding 
world.  He argues it is from these interactions, often strikingly absent in autistic 
children, in which the developing infant comes to discover through exploratory 
interactions with others that the world can be creatively represented from a range 
of affective perspectives, that the more sophisticated mentalising and empathic 
abilities, as implicated in Baron-Cohen’s (1997) cognitive approach, emerge.  
Hobson (2006) suggests that the autistic individual approaches the interpersonal 
world from a very different position from those of other children, distinguished by 
the absence of a propensity to “be moved” to orient themselves in relation to 
others’ subjectivity. 
 
Hobson’s account holds some appeal in so far as his portrayal of intersubjectivity 
appears to be closer to the lived interpersonal world as typically experienced, in 
which most people are motivated not only to understand or empathise with 
others, but, moreover, to share experiences with them.  Nonetheless, Hobson’s 
work has not exerted as wide an influence as has Baron-Cohen’s, and even 
those sympathetic to his approach have suggested that he may, in rejecting 
cognitive modelling, inevitably oversimplify his account of relationality (e.g. 
Bowler, 2007).   
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1.3.2.4 Critical Notes on Autism Research 
Autism has proven to be a captivating subject for researchers, clinicians, and, 
increasingly, the general public.  Yet, it is important to consider the import of the 
overarching paradigms within which most of the literature on autism is situated.   
 
Perhaps the most evident paradigm is that of the diagnosis itself.  The validity of 
“autism” as a diagnostic construct has received widespread acceptance, even if 
the relation between different “spectrum disorders” has been the matter of some 
debate.  However, this validity requires that there be a shared cause underlying 
both social-communication and non-social features of the diagnosis.  A recent 
review of relevant research suggests that within the general population, these 
dimensions of autistic symptomatology are not significantly correlated and so are 
unlikely to share a common underlying cause (Mandy & Skuse, 2008).  If a 
dimensional approach to autism is accepted, this finding calls into question the 
construct of an autistic syndrome.  However, even if the concurrent presence of 
different “symptoms” does not indicate a unitary underlying “condition”, the 
constellation of features may yet signify a distinct mode of experiencing the 
world, and so inquiry into the experience of “autistic” adults remains a valid 
pursuit.  
 
Another, more subtle, paradigm is that of absence.  By this, I mean to suggest 
that autism has been constructed and portrayed in its intersubjective qualities in 
terms of what for or within the autistic person is lacking – a theory of mind, 
empathy, the disposition to “be moved” by the other.  The conceptualisation of 
autism in terms of negativity may be “symptomatic” of wider psychiatric 
discourse, within which mental deviation is located as a site of absence in 
contrast to which common human rationality derives meaning (e.g. Foucault, 
1967).  However, the positioning of autism in particular as a site of absence has 
been important for researchers for its value in illuminating aspects of normal 
human development by comparison; Hobson (2002, p.46) has commented that, 
in researching autistic intersubjectivity, “it is the very unfamiliarity of the viewpoint 
that reveals what is otherwise too familiar to be found striking.”     
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Such an approach holds validity, and has indeed provided important insights for 
developmental psychology as well as leading to practical interventions to aid 
autistic individuals.  However, even if the absence or impairment of certain 
“normal” psychological faculties in autism is accepted as valid, the question is 
nonetheless begged as to how autistic individuals come to experience others – 
an issue quite neglected in present research.   
 
There is, therefore, a dire need for the recognition of what Stuart Murray (2008) 
has termed “autistic presence” – that way in which the autistic individual exists 
distinctively as himself in such a manner as resists definition in terms of that 
which he is not; that which is occluded by the clinical gaze, which withstands it.  
The lack of precision in the concept is itself cutting – for all the exactness which 
clinical literature demands of itself in renewing and refining its understanding of 
the structure of autism, the world of the autistic individual remains elusive and 
irreducible: 
 
‘I view ‘autistic’ as a word for how part of my brain works, not for a narrow 
set of behaviours, and certainly not for a set of boundaries of stereotypes 
that I have to stay inside.’  - Activist Amanda Baggs (quoted in Murray, 
2008, p. 44). 
 
‘The autist is always himself.’  - Hans Asperger (1991, p.38) 
 
‘He just is there.’ -  Leo Kanner (1943, p.247) 
 
I will argue below that phenomenological inquiry holds potential for bringing this 
presence forth.  However, it will first be necessary to explore the rationale for 
placing the phenomenon of ‘closeness’ at the centre of the study. 
 
1.4 Autism and Closeness 
1.4.1 Closeness and Romantic Relationships 
As with autism research, the literature on romantic closeness has been 
predominantly quantitative (see Mashek & Aron, 2004, for an overview); in 
contrast, however, an array of definitions of the term has been employed in 
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different strands of research.  Closeness is a construct for which the 
psychological literature has not offered a unitary definition.  The use of 
nomenclature within research is itself unclear; in reviewing the literature, I have 
included the keyword “intimacy” in electronic searches, as the term is more 
frequently employed than, but often used interchangeably with, “closeness”.  For 
either construct, a difficulty in reaching an operational definition is present in that 
they are “natural types”, characterised by shifting sets of features in their ordinary 
use, such that it is difficult to formulate clear criteria for what would differentiate a 
relationship that is “close” or “intimate” from one that is not without either 
becoming overly inclusive or omitting significant dimensions of the terms’ 
generally accepted meanings (Prager, 1995).  Divergent conceptualisations 
within the literature are thus not necessarily in competition, but rather may be 
addressing different aspects of the ordinary uses of the term. 
 
Early social psychological research on closeness generally employed a rather 
restrictive focus on processes of verbal self-disclosure of private information (e.g. 
Patterson, 1976).  While research has, over the past twenty-five years, adopted 
more comprehensive understandings of closeness and intimacy, a common 
thread has been maintained in the centrality of mutual knowledge within 
conceptualisations of the construct.   
 
Most influential within research has been Reis and Shaver’s (1988) interpersonal 
process model.  Reis and Shaver (1988) define intimacy as an interpersonal, 
transactional process, of which the principal components are self-disclosure and 
partner responsiveness.  According to the model, intimacy emerges when one 
person communicates, verbally or otherwise, personally relevant and revealing 
information about their thoughts or feelings, and receives a response from the 
other which makes them feel understood, validated, and cared for.  Laurenceau, 
Barrett, and Pietromonaco (1998) introduced a distinction between emotional 
and informational self-disclosure, the former of which appears a more powerful 
predictor of intimacy.  A review of evaluation studies has supported the 
hypothesis that greater frequency of the processes implicated in the model is 
associated with greater reported levels of intimacy in relationships (Laurenceau, 
Rivera, Schafer,& Pietromonaco, 2004).  The model holds particular utility in its 
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provision of a clear operationalisation of intimacy as a process, and, as such, has 
formed the basis for a multitude of studies on the variables influencing the 
process of intimacy (e.g. Cutrona, Shaffer, Wesner, & Gardner, 2007). 
 
Reis and Shaver’s approach has been significantly expanded upon by Karen J. 
Prager (Prager, 1995; Prager and Roberts, 2004).  Prager and Roberts (2004) 
propose that intimate interactions can be distinguished from non-intimate 
interactions by the presence of three distinct conditions: self-revealing behaviour, 
positive involvement with the other, and shared understandings.  In order for an 
interaction to create intimacy, a partner must be able and willing to reveal private, 
personal aspects of themselves, verbally or non-verbally, in the context of an 
experience of the other as fully, directly, and positively attentive towards the self.  
Furthermore, the interaction must establish shared understandings of one 
another’s selves: “both partners experience a sense of knowing or understanding 
some aspect of the other’s inner experience – from private thoughts, feelings, or 
beliefs, to characteristic rhythms, habits, or routines” (p.45).  Intimate interactions 
will vary in aspects such as affective intensity or the degree of privacy of the 
aspects of self revealed, with repeated interactions of significant intimacy 
allowing the development of shared personal understandings and the growth of 
relational intimacy.  Prager and Roberts’ (2004) expansion on Reis and Shaver’s 
(1988) model thus gives a clear rationale for seeing romantic relationships (when 
successful) as the platform par excellence for intimacy.   
 
Prager and Roberts (2004) also argue for the significance within intimacy of the 
distinction between a partner’s self-concept and their organismic, or experiential, 
self.  A self-concept that conceals or omits aspects of an individual’s experiential 
self precludes full intimacy.  Prager and Roberts (2004) offer the example of a 
husband who conceives of himself as ambitious and emotionally invulnerable, 
who must thus conceal from himself and his partner inner experiences of 
vulnerability.  Such incongruence between the self-concept and experiential self 
represents a profound barrier to intimacy, which requires the revelation and 
knowledge to both parties of the “true self”. 
 
 14 
 
Regarding the potential distinction between intimacy and closeness, Moss and 
Schwebel (1993), reviewing the definitions of intimacy used within research 
predating their paper, define closeness as a specific component of intimacy, 
characterised by either partner’s knowledge of the other’s “inner” cognitive and 
affective experiences; the other components are, according to the authors, 
mutual positive affect and commitment. 
 
Finally, an intriguing and widely influential model of closeness (as distinguished 
more clearly from intimacy) defines the construct as the inclusion of the other in 
the self (Aron, Aron, Tudor,& Nelson, 1991).  According to the “self-expansion 
model”, ‘closeness’ signifies a state in which an individual’s self has come to 
encompass elements that properly belong to another.  As such, an individual 
may be prone to experiencing resources, perspectives, and identities as they are 
perceived to be held by the proximal other.  For example, when viewing a film, a 
man may actually experience the movie in an immediate, unreflective fashion as 
he believes it would be experienced by his partner.  A range of experimental 
findings have largely supported the central hypotheses of the model (see Aron, 
Mashek,& Aron, 2004).  However, while the model provides an interesting 
perspective on the permeability of the boundary between self and other, the 
related literature has focused overwhelmingly on non-affective cognitive 
processes – notwithstanding an interesting recent fMRI study which found that 
the same neural networks were activated in participants when imagining painful 
situations occurring for themselves and for loved ones (poignantly entitle ‘Love 
Hurts’ - Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou,& Decety, 2010).   
 
1.4.2 Critical Notes on Closeness Research 
The major difficulty with research in this field is not empirical but conceptual.  
Researchers on intimacy and closeness are generally well aware of the inherent 
difficulty in reaching a universally acceptable definition of the construct.  A central 
problem is that a model will only be of utility in so far as the definition upon which 
it is based offers some precision, and yet it must also find validity in the ordinary, 
imprecise uses made of the terms (Prager, 1995).  However, the issue is not only 
in imprecision.  More profoundly, confusion remains as to the exact class or type 
of “thing” closeness, as a term, signifies.  The conceptualisations given 
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encompass broad constellations of experiences, affective and cognitive 
processes, epistemic states, and behaviours.  Clearly, a comprehensive 
understanding of the term must encompass each of these domains.  Yet, each 
stands as a distinct form of object of inquiry, requiring a particular method of 
investigation and form of language to be adequately studied and described.  A 
definition which seeks from the outset to be all-encompassing thus risks being of 
limited utility in illuminating the nature of the diverse classes of constructs which 
must be encompassed within.   
 
The conceptual is also ethical.  A significant critique of the prevailing definitions 
assigned to closeness is that they seem to favour stereotypically feminine 
aspects of relating.  Wood and Inman (1993), reviewing the construction of the 
construct of intimacy in research from the 1960’s, argue that the fairly robust 
finding that women, more than men, prioritized disclosive communication was 
conflated with a predetermined definition of intimacy in terms of such forms of 
communication.  As such, women came to be seen on the whole as more expert 
on intimacy, and more traditionally masculine intersubjectivity came to be 
depreciated as “less intimate”.  While I do not wish here to endorse an 
essentialist view of gender and relationality, it is significant that studies 
specifically focused on men’s perceptions of intimacy have provided alternative 
perspectives on ‘closeness’.  For example, Swain (1989) drew attention to what 
she called ‘closeness in the doing’ in the shared interests and activities that 
characterise many male friendships.  Patrick and Beckenbach (2009), 
interviewing men regarding their views of intimacy, identified sharing, trust, 
genuineness and acceptance as central themes.  It is also arguable that the very 
constructs of closeness and intimacy, as conceptualised in the research, are only 
intelligible within the specific cultures within which they are produced.  The 
overriding emphasis on dyadic relationships within western culture have can, in 
fact, be argued to betray subtly a loneliness produced by contemporary 
individualism (Seepersad, Choi,& Shin, 2008). 
 
1.4.3 Closeness and Autism 
While it is not known how many people with autism enter into romantic 
relationships, it is clear from a number of sources (e.g. Aston, 2003; Henault, 
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2006; Hendrickx, 2008) that some do, posing the interesting question as to how 
closeness, universally agreed by researchers to represent a central dimension of 
romantic relationships, is established within these relationships, or what precisely 
might be the nature of obstacles encountered.  However, there exists at present 
no research on the issue of closeness/intimacy and autism, so a consideration of 
the potential implications of intimacy research for relationships in which a partner 
has ASD must remain largely inferential, though reference may be made to 
empirical papers on related constructs, as well as to a number of popular 
publications on the issue of romantic relationships and autism.   
 
The conditions for intimacy – understanding, validation, and care - outlined in 
Reis and Shaver’s (1988) interpersonal process model may appear strikingly 
challenging for either partner to provide or receive in the presence of ASD within 
a relationship.  If either the mindblindness or empathy deficit hypothesis is 
accepted as valid, it follows that an autistic individual may have extreme difficulty 
understanding the complex perspectives and emotions disclosed in intimate 
exchange, or, moreover, in responding affectively in the way expected within 
relationships.  Equally, the autistic partner may be expected to have difficulty 
articulating his emotions in such a way as can be understood and validated by 
the other.   
 
Research on a construct sharing significant overlap with autism offers some 
support for these hypotheses.  “Alexithymia” is a term used in research to 
describe a putative condition in which individuals are chronically unable to 
understand, process, and communicate emotion (Sifneos, 1973), although it is 
not included in any widely used diagnostic manual.  As well as finding common 
ground between the two constructs at a definitional level, Hill, Berthoz, and Frith 
(2004) found that 85% of a sample of autistic individuals (N=27) scored in the 
‘impaired’ range on an alexithymia assessment inventory, suggesting that 
cautious inferences regarding autism may be made from research pertaining to 
alexithymia.  Humphreys, Wood, and Parker (2009) found traits of alexithymia to 
be inversely correlated with the level of affection participants showed in their 
closest relationships, as well as the overall level of closeness achieved.  In so far 
as autistic individuals show impairments in the understanding and 
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communication of emotion, this study supports the hypothesis that they may 
experience challenges in establishing closeness.  This finding is also congruent 
with the importance attributed to emotional understanding by Reis and Shaver 
(1988) and Prager (1995; Prager and Roberts, 2004). 
 
A second theme in the closeness literature which is of particular interest in 
relation to autism is the significance of shared experience.  By this I mean the 
suggestion that an intimate partner is one who is able to not only demonstrate a 
declarative understanding of her partner’s feelings, but is, moreover, driven to 
experience the world as if from the vantage point of her significant other, and to 
desire the same in reciprocation.  Again, the supposed mentalising deficit in 
autism prospectively poses profound challenges.  To what extent can an autistic 
individual not only comprehend her partner’s thoughts and feelings, but also step 
into his shoes through construing the world in a meta-representational fashion?  
To what extent is she likely to ‘be moved’, in Hobson’s (2006) phrase, towards 
this pursuit? The challenge is not restricted to the autistic partner, however.  The 
neurotypical individual may struggle to understand the meaning of his autistic 
partner’s behaviour in terms of her underlying experiences, particularly if she is 
neither able nor inclined to communicate these to him.  Confronted with 
behaviour that may appear aloof or distant, he may construe his partner as 
uncaring or unresponsive to the world or even to him.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this inability to discern the world of the autistic individual may lead 
neurotypical partners to value the insight into their partner’s behaviour they may 
feel is provided by the diagnosis.  For example, Katrin Bentley’s (2007) 
autobiographical account of her marriage to a man with Asperger’s Syndrome 
details the retrospective understandings she reached of hitherto bewildering or 
hurtful communications from her partner through employing theories of ASD. 
 
It might be even argued from an overview of the prevailing approaches to autism 
and closeness that the very possibility of closeness might be largely precluded 
by the conditions of autistic intersubjectivity.  The recognition of private and 
deeply personal thoughts and feelings in the other; the drive to share and 
validate sensitive experiences: if these are the core conditions of closeness, then 
the very notion of closeness/intimacy may be unintelligible: “Intimacy can be a 
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vague concept for many individuals with AS,” writes Isabelle Henault (2006, 
p.90).   
 
Indeed, there exists within the popular literature on romantic relationships and 
autism, largely written directly for the partners of autistic individuals, a prevailing 
sense that the establishment of closeness and intimacy will pose specific and 
profound challenges.  Sarah Hendrickx (2008) writes of the frustration and 
resentment that may be caused for both partners by the normative expectation 
that the autistic partner will be readily able to understand her partner’s 
experiences, and suggests that for someone with ASD, emotional closeness may 
be experienced as intrusive and overwhelming.  Louise Weston (2010) 
emphasises the need for the neurotypical individual to listen attentively to her 
Asperger’s partner, as otherwise she too may be prone to misunderstanding, and 
recommends that she actively seek out alternative avenues for meeting certain 
intimate needs, such as finding support groups in which to be understood and 
validated.  The potential concerns raised by the effects of autism within a 
relationship appear to some authors as so significant that Maxine Aston has 
gone so far as to propose a new diagnostic label for severely afflicted 
neurotypical partners, ‘Cassandra Affect Deprivation Disorder’ (Aston, 2003).   
 
1.4.4 Issues in Considering Closeness in the Context of Autism 
The first issue to be noted when considering the implications of autism for the 
establishment of closeness within relationships is that, at present, there is a lack 
of an empirical basis for the evaluation of any hypotheses.  While there exist a 
number of popular publications on romance and ASD that may be found useful 
by their target audiences, they largely reflect the individual experiences of the 
authors.  Alternatively, where the perspectives of wider samples have been 
sought, recruitment and analysis have not utilised a formal methodology. 
 
The second issue is that it is unclear what understanding of “closeness” is most 
useful and valid in this area.  And yet, although there is a lack of a clear definition 
of the construct, “closeness” is generally given within the literature as the remit of 
the (invariably female) neurotypical partner.  It is suggested numerous times that 
the ASD partner requires assistance not only to provide some measure of 
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intimacy for his partner, but even to recognise his own “need” for closeness.  The 
essentialist split on which the popular literature is founded, and which it in turn 
reinforces, is such that the Asperger and neurotypical partners can become 
within the texts ‘different species’ (Weston, 2010).  While at least one writer has 
recognised the multiplicity of meanings which might be assigned to closeness or 
intimacy (Henault, 2006), the language of intersubjectivity is generally made the 
property of the “neurotypical species”. 
 
A need is thus present for an approach which examines “closeness” as a signifier 
with potentially diverse meanings within different individuals’ lived experiences.  
The terms of such an endeavour resonate with the need, described above, to 
comprehend autism in substantive terms, seeking out presence in autistic 
subjectivity and refraining from imposing normative understandings.  This is not 
to deny suffering: autism as a label by definition denotes an interpersonal stance 
or positioning which may, indeed, pose significant challenges for the 
establishment of closeness.  Nonetheless, the requirement is for an approach 
which seeks out substance in “autism” and “closeness” as terms widely 
employed, already sometimes directly juxtaposed, but not yet fully explored in all 
their significatory potential. 
 
1.5 Autism, Intersubjectivity, and Phenomenology 
1.5.1 Phenomenological Inquiry 
Phenomenology is a mode of inquiry into experience, in which the elucidation of 
the core dimensions of phenomena as phenomena is pursued.  While the vast 
range of ideas which fall under the banner of phenomenology mean that it cannot 
be reduced to a single method, at the core of the mode of inquiry is the 
suspension (epochė - Husserl, 1988) or “bracketing” of everyday assumptions 
regarding the reality of the experienced world, with the nature of experience itself 
made the object of inquiry.  The originator of phenomenology proper, Edmund 
Husserl (1988), aimed through his investigations to reach an understanding of a 
transcendental subjectivity.  Phenomenology as a movement was radically 
transformed by Heidegger’s (1996) profound argument that the phenomena must 
be understood in terms of a perceived world to which we relate in an engaged 
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fashion, and to which we assign meaning as worldly beings (the ‘hermeneutic 
turn’ – Hoy, 1993). 
 
There is a history of fruitful dialogue between phenomenological inquiry and 
‘realist’ science.  Within philosophy, Merleau-Ponty (2002), for example, made 
use of accounts of the experiences of individuals with neurological damage to 
illuminate his study of ‘typical’ phenomenology by way of contrast (in a fashion 
similar to the use of autism research in developmental psychology).  More 
recently, Ratcliffe (2006) has argued for dialogue between phenomenology and 
cognitive neuroscience, arguing that phenomenology can give meaning to 
scientific findings, while science can in turn indicate how the experience of 
different phenomena becomes possible.  In more recent years, 
phenomenologically oriented methods have become more widely employed in 
psychological research (see Langdridge, 2007, for an overview). 
 
1.5.2 Phenomenology and Autism: Conceptual Problems 
An immediate objection may be posed to the proposal that phenomenology may 
offer insight into the experiences of those affected by autism.  Several leading 
researchers and theorists of autism have made arguments that the condition 
involves either impairment in or an absence of self-consciousness.  Gopnik 
(1993) argues that the development of a theory of mind is essential to 
understanding intentional states not only in others, but also in the self.  While 
autistic individuals are, she argues, able to experience “simple sensations”, to 
the extent that they have impaired “theory of mind”, they are unable to possess 
proper intentional states.  In support of this argument, she invokes the finding, 
detailed above, that autistic children are not only impaired in identifying false 
beliefs in others, but are also challenged by tasks requiring them to identify 
previously held but disproven false beliefs.  She writes: 
 
We first have psychological states, then we observe the behaviours and the 
experiences that they lead to in ourselves and others, then we construct a 
theory about the causes of those behaviours and experiences that 
postulate intentionality, and only then do we have an experience of the 
intentionality of those states.  (Gopnik, 1993, p.12) 
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The implication of the argument would be that, if phenomenological inquiry 
involves an interrogation regarding phenomena as experienced intentionally, 
then autism precludes any meaningful phenomenological inquiry into the 
experience of autistic individuals.   
 
However, it can be argued in response that a distinction must be made between 
the intentional stance, in which a complex understanding of the relationship 
between self and object as mediated by perceptual and mentalistic processes is 
reached, and an intentional experience, in which an object is perceived in 
relation to an observing self.  Indeed, phenomenological analysis would suggest 
that the notion of a “non-intentional experience” is a contradiction in terms, for 
the perception of any object includes within it a self to which it is given, however 
unelaborated this ‘self’ may be (Sartre, 1956).  Moreover, Gopnik’s approach 
poses unanswered questions about whether infants should also be judged as not 
self-aware, a suggestion Hobson’s (2002) portrayal of early intersubjectivity 
would appear to contradict (Zahavi & Parnas, 2003). 
 
A similar argument to Gopnik’s (1993) is made by Frith and Happe (1999), who 
propose that autistic individuals are in possession of experiential mental states, 
but that they are unable to reflect upon them.  From this, they make something of 
a logical leap as they proceed to suggest that autistic individuals are not self-
conscious.  The nature of the proposed qualitative difference involved in 
reflective self-awareness is never precisely explained by the authors, however.  
The crucial issue is, perhaps, to note that self-awareness, even of a declarative 
sort, needs to be distinguished from complex self-knowledge – to have an 
experience of what might be mentalistically termed a thought or a belief which 
one can report verbally does not require that one understands these experiences 
as thoughts or beliefs (Zahavi and Parnas, 2003).   
 
1.5.3 Towards a Phenomenological Approach to Autistic (Inter)subjectivity 
What value, then, might phenomenological inquiry hold for “autism research”? 
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I return first to the ideal of autistic presence, that substantive aspect of the 
autistic individual which has been excluded from most research.  If the prevailing 
approach to autism has sought to construct the condition in terms of absence, a 
phenomenological approach to the experience of the autistic individual offers a 
framework within which presence cannot but emerge; phenomenology 
represents a call to understand the phenomenon of the Other as it presents itself 
for the autistic individual, and likewise to understand how she is present for 
others.  This is not to say that what emerges is positive in valence; it is not to 
deny the phenomenal existence of challenges or suffering.  Nor is it to deny that 
absence may present itself substantively as a phenomenon, or dimension 
thereof; as Sartre (1956) demonstrated, absences can be a salient dimension of 
phenomena. 
 
Over recent years, a number of studies have used phenomenological methods 
fruitfully to explore the experiences of autistic individuals.  Biklen (2005) has 
edited a compilation of phenomenologically-oriented autobiographical accounts 
of people diagnosed with autism.  Huws and Jones (2008) carried out an 
interpretative phenomenological analysis using interviews with a group of 
diagnosed children to explore the experiences of diagnosis, disclosure, and 
‘having autism’.  It is striking, however, that only two papers appear to have 
considered the phenomenology of the intersubjective encounter in the context of 
autism.  Williams (2004) has analysed published autobiographical accounts of 
individuals with autism, from which she argues that the notion of ‘theory of mind’, 
in its connotations of abstracted theory-based engagement with the other, is in 
fact an apt description of the authors’ engagement with others.  Cashin (2004) 
explores existential aspects of parenting a child with autism.  He argues that the 
experience involves fundamental changes in their subjectivity through the 
permeation of their children’s difficulties into their parents’ own selves.  Moments 
of ‘connection’, of sharing an experience, are nonetheless manifest in parents’ 
narratives. 
 
Phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity have also challenged the 
frameworks within which theories of social cognitive deficits in autism have been 
developed.  Dan Zahavi (2005), a phenomenological philosopher, questions the 
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notion that the mind of the other exists as an inferred, ‘theoretical’ entity in the 
intersubjective encounter.  He notes that a phenomenological investigation 
suggests that the mind of the other is encountered in all its affective significance 
directly in expressive phenomena: we see a face as friendly or angry, rather than 
the emotion being experienced as an inferred mental construct.  The question is 
whether a ‘theory of mind’ adequately captures the lived experience of the face-
to-face encounter.  While the sort of automatic, pre-reflective processes 
postulated in models of theory of mind are still by this picture feasible, it is 
striking for Zahavi (2003; 2005) that infants normally show clear affective 
reactions towards others well before the development of complex understandings 
of mentalistic phenomena, suggesting that intersubjectivity should be understood 
first as an embodied emotional/perceptual ‘skill’, rather than the product of 
theoretical postulates.  However, while Hobson (2002) and even, to a certain 
extent, Baron-Cohen (1997) acknowledge the importance of developmentally 
early intersubjectivity, Zahavi (2003; 2005) argues strongly that pre-‘theoretical’ 
intersubjectivity remains primary not only in chronological development, but, 
moreover, in all face-to-face human encounters.   
 
An important implication of this is that the question of the experience of ‘the 
Other’ for autistic individuals becomes intelligible in a way that might be 
precluded within a framework which denies the very notion that an experience of 
the Other is possible in the absence of a theory of mind.  Moreover, a 
phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity steps beyond an exploration of 
the dynamic effects of cognitive and behavioural differences to ask what 
precisely might define the experience of a relationship with an autistic individual. 
 
A phenomenological approach may furthermore be of particular value in freeing 
‘closeness’ in its status as a signifier from the conceptual problems besetting 
contemporary research.  As noted above, research on ‘closeness’ (or ‘intimacy’) 
is beset with a conceptual problem in so far as the nature of the object of 
research has not been clearly defined.  A phenomenological approach would 
conceptualise ‘closeness’ strictly as a signifier denoting an aspect, or perhaps 
several aspects, of an individual’s lived experience, and, from these conditions, 
allow the various experiential dimensions of intimacy to emerge in a ‘bottom-up’ 
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fashion from an investigation of qualitative data – circumventing the need to 
advance a hypothetical, researcher-defined model requiring post-hoc validation.  
Moreover, an approach which seeks out the hermeneutic position of ‘closeness’ 
for individuals vis a vis their lived experiences offers an opportunity to evade the 
procrustean process of setting forth researcher-defined constructs according to 
which levels of closeness may be universally measured and individuals and 
couples ranked.  Rather, the potential exists for the signifier to perform multiple 
significations, varying according to the broader phenomenological dimensions of 
an individual’s lived experience. 
 
1.6 Aims and Research Questions for the Present Study 
The aims for the present study are: 
1. To explore the experiences and understandings of closeness for people 
with a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder in long-term romantic 
relationships, as well as of non-diagnosed partners in relationships with 
them. 
2. To work towards an understanding of the experience of autistic individuals 
and those close to them constituted in substantive terms. 
3. To consider the potential implications of the findings for understandings of 
romantic relationships in the context of autism; for conceptualisations of 
the constructs of autism and closeness; for clinical practice with 
individuals from the populations included in the study; and for future 
research on this and related topics. 
 
The research questions for the present study are: 
1. In what ways is closeness understood and experienced by either partner 
in romantic relationships in which one has been given a diagnosis of an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder? 
2. In what ways is the experience of closeness facilitated or hindered for 
either partner? 
3. In what ways, if any, is autism experienced as a phenomenal object 
affecting closeness within the relationship? 
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2.  Methodology 
In this chapter, the procedures employed in the recruitment of participants, 
obtainment of data, and analysis are outlined, and a rationale for each given.  In 
line with the hermeneutic orientation of the present study, the chapter closes with 
a consideration of reflexive issues pertinent to the analysis. 
 
2.1 Design 
As the research question concerned the nature of an experience – ‘closeness’ – 
as well as the significance of the phenomenon for individuals in a specific context 
– romantic relationships in which one partner has a diagnosis of an Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) – the study required a hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach.  Thus, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009) was selected as the most appropriate method.  Data 
was collected through semi-structured interviews with individuals in long-term 
romantic relationships whose partners had been given formal diagnoses of ASD, 
or who had been diagnosed themselves.  The analysis focused on the meanings 
‘closeness’ held for individuals.  The data was analysed collectively, without 
grouping individuals according to the presence or absence of a diagnosis. 
 
2.2 Ethics 
Full ethical approval was obtained from the University of East London School of 
Psychology Ethics Committee prior to commencing with recruitment.  An image 
of the application for ethical approval signed by the Chair of the Committee is 
given in Appendix A. 
 
2.3 Participants 
2.3.1 Sampling 
For the present study, individuals both with and without a diagnosis of ASD were 
recruited as participants.  This use of a “mixed” sample is unconventional within 
IPA research, in which homogenous samples are usually sought (Smith et al., 
2009).  However, as romantic relationships are by definition intersubjective, the 
study sought to include the experiences of individuals on ‘both sides’ of the 
diagnosis.  Furthermore, the present research sought to illuminate the core 
dimensions of specific phenomena, and phenomenological research with this 
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objective can benefit from using diverse samples, as emergent thematic 
commonalities can differentiate essential from incidental aspects of the 
phenomenon (Langdridge, 2007). 
 
It was planned that eight to ten participants would be recruited for the study, with 
at least four participants with a diagnosis and four without.  The use of a small 
sample reflects the idiographic orientation of IPA, in which a thorough disclosure 
of participants’ experiences is sought, allowing a degree of exploration and 
acknowledgement of diversity that is often excluded by the demands of 
nomothetic, large-scale studies (Smith et al., 2009). 
 
The inclusion criteria were as follows: 
1. Either the participants or their partners should have received a formal 
diagnosis of an Autism Spectrum Disorder (including Autism and 
Asperger’s Syndrome) from a mental health professional.   
2. One partner in the relationship should not have received a diagnosis of 
ASD.  This was to ensure that the relationships included in the study 
would be comparable. 
3. The diagnosis should have occurred at least one year before participation 
in the study.  This requirement was included both for ethical and 
hermeneutic reasons.  The receipt of a diagnosis for one’s self or one’s 
partner can hold profound significance, and so it was felt that ample time 
should be left before inviting affected individuals to participate in an 
interview in which related emotive material would be discussed.  
Furthermore, a diagnosis of ASD may lead both partners to re-evaluate 
previous understandings of themselves, their partners, and their 
relationships.  Data gathered from individuals in the wake of diagnosis 
would, therefore, be of questionable comparability to data gathered from 
individuals who have had a greater length of time to adjust to the 
diagnosis. 
4. Participants should have been in a romantic relationship with their partner 
for at least one year prior to taking part in the study.  This criterion was 
necessary to allow the assumption that sufficient time had passed for the 
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participants to have acquired an understanding of how they experience 
closeness in relation to their partners.   
 
The time specifications in criteria three and four are, admittedly, somewhat 
arbitrary.  However, due to the dearth of prior research in this area, there is a 
lack of evidence to suggest alternative criteria.  Moreover, it was anticipated at 
the outset that recruitment might be challenging, and so a minimally restrictive 
set of inclusion criteria was required. 
 
There were two exclusion criteria.  First, for ethical reasons, it was required that 
participants would not be considering leaving their relationship at the time of the 
study, in order that participation should not, as far as possible, be to the 
detriment of participants’ relationships, nor of their own or their partners’ well-
being.  Second, participants were not included when either or both partners had 
a diagnosis of learning disability.  While more research into romantic 
relationships for people with learning disabilities is very much needed, the 
inclusion of this additional diagnostic construct risked creating a degree of 
complexity in the data requiring an analysis beyond the scope of the present 
project. 
 
2.3.2 Recruitment  
The recruitment of participants proved arduous.  It was initially planned that all 
interviews would be conducted face-to-face.  The first stage of recruitment 
involved performing internet searches to identify networks within commuting 
distance from London either including or supporting individuals with the diagnosis 
or their partners.  These included internet forums, support agencies, research 
groups, and counselling services; in total, information about the project was sent 
via e-mail and post to over thirty groups (an example is given in Appendix B).  
With the administrators’ permission, information about the project was also 
posted on several internet forums specifically designed for people with the 
diagnosis and their families.   
 
This first stage of recruitment gained the participation of two individuals over 
three months (from June to September, 2011).  Following this disappointing 
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outcome, both the recruitment and interview procedures were amended, with 
permission from the Chair of the Ethics Board at UEL (see Appendices C and D).  
The data collection procedure was broadened to include the possibility of 
telephone and electronic interviews, allowing the participation of individuals living 
some distance from London.  Updated recruitment information was sent to 
several groups who had expressed interest in the research, and existing posts on 
internet forums were updated.  The recruitment process was also expanded to 
allow information about the research to be distributed directly to individuals 
eligible for participation who had placed information about themselves in the 
public domain (e.g. through weblogs).  Finally, the National Autistic Society kindly 
agreed to include information about the research in their members’ magazine.  
Following these changes, a further six participants were recruited by January 
2012. 
 
2.4 Data Collection 
2.4.1 Materials 
Four interviews were conducted face-to-face, for which a digital audio recorder 
was utilised.  Three interviews were conducted telephonically, two with 
diagnosed participants and one with an undiagnosed partner.  For these 
interviews, I spoke with participants via Skype™ on a personal laptop using a 
USB headset; the interviews were recorded using ‘MP3 Skype Recorder’, a free 
software package available online.  Finally, one participant was interviewed at 
her request over the internet using MSN Messenger.  For all interviews, I used a 
copy of the interview schedule (given in Appendix E), as well as a notepad.  All 
electronically recorded data was stored on a password-protected laptop; the data 
were also transcribed on this laptop, with the recordings played back using the 
‘Express Scribe’ software package (also available online). 
 
2.4.2 Interview Schedule 
The interviews conducted for the study were semi-structured, as is standard 
within IPA (Smith et al., 2009).  The central aim of the interview was to address 
two questions.  First, what is the meaning of ‘closeness’ for this participant?  
Second, in what ways does he/she experience ‘closeness’ in the context of 
his/her present relationship?  The interview schedule developed was, therefore, 
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used as a tool for setting a framework within which these questions could be 
explored, and, as such, was intended to be used flexibly, with the elicited 
narrative and reflections, rather than the schedule, driving the interview, in so far 
as the aforementioned questions continued to be addressed. 
 
Nonetheless, the schedule formed an important guide for the interview.  The 
opening question and prompts concerned the background to the participant’s 
relationship (including its duration and development, marital and living 
arrangements) as well as the diagnosis (when and how it was obtained, and its 
significance for either partner).  While these ‘scene setting’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 
61) questions were not directly related to the research questions, such contextual 
information can be hermeneutically invaluable, and, as they are relatively easy 
for participants to answer, can facilitate the development of rapport.  Subsequent 
items aimed to explore directly the participant’s experience of closeness, 
funnelling down from the general (“What does ‘closeness’ mean to you?”) to the 
specific (“Can you describe an experience in which you have felt close to your 
partner?”).  These items made up the bulk of the interview.  As “closeness” is by 
definition an intersubjective process, an item was also included querying the 
participant’s understanding of his or her partner’s experiences of closeness.  
While the diagnosis of ASD was queried in the initial item, no questions or 
prompts were planned for the main body of the interview regarding the diagnosis, 
unless it emerged as a significant experiential theme within the participants’ 
narratives.  Only in the last item was the participant queried on how, if at all, he 
or she experienced the impact of ASD on closeness in their relationship.  The 
interview schedule was, as far as possible, not guided by any preconceptions as 
to the meaning of “closeness”, nor by a priori hypotheses regarding the nature of 
participants’ experiences.   
 
The schedule was discussed with my research supervisor, which led to minor 
amendments in the wording of items.  While it would have been ideal to have 
piloted the interview with individuals meeting the inclusion criteria, due to the 
difficulties encountered in recruitment, this was not possible.   
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As the first contact made with each participant was via the internet, 
arrangements for the interviews were made through e-mail, and participants 
were invited to ask any questions they might have prior to the interview.  Copies 
of the research information sheet and consent form (given in Appendices F and 
G, respectively) were e-mailed to participants ahead of the interviews, and 
participants were asked to confirm that they met the inclusion criteria.  Signed 
consent sheets were obtained prior to commencing with the interview. 
 
2.4.3 Interview Procedure 
At the start of each interview, time was spent explaining the format and purpose 
of the interview.  Participants were reminded that they would be free to pause or 
stop the interview at any point, without giving a reason.  Participants were again 
invited to ask any questions they might have, prior to commencing with the 
interview. 
 
The progression of the interviews followed the schedule in moving from general 
to specific experiences.  During the discussion of the “scene setting” interview 
items, a comfortable interview pace and rhythm was sought; as the interview 
unfolded, in most instances fewer and more open prompts were used.  As the 
research questions concerned the significance of experiences ‘as lived’, 
participants were encouraged through prompting to remain focused on their own 
experiences rather than abstract understandings (van Manen, 1990).  Following 
Smith et al.’s (2009) guidelines for interviewing, participants were encouraged to 
pursue narratives or reflections, assisted, when appropriate, by prompts and 
probes, until these reached what seemed a natural conclusion.  When a 
potentially significant topic emerged which could not be immediately pursued, I 
made a note of it and returned to it later in the interview. 
 
The participant’s contribution to the dialogue already represents an interpretation 
of the phenomenon being investigated, developed through the medium of the 
interview conversation – as van Manen (1990) argues, the interview is a process 
of “interpretation through conversation” (p.97) and interviewees are, in fact, “co-
investigators” (p.98).  The interviewer must, therefore, act cautiously to 
selectively elicit further and more in-depth reflection by the interviewee while 
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refraining from introducing themes that may not naturally emerge from the 
interviewee’s interpretations.  Hence, I took it as my task when probing for further 
details to be minimally guiding, making an effort to restrict prompts to simple, 
open requests for more details on what experiences were ‘like’ (Roulston, 2010).  
Although it was not possible to maintain this line at all times, the use of more 
directive questions regarding, for example, participants’ ‘thoughts’ or ‘feelings’, 
risked disrupting participants’ interpretative reflections, in which ‘thoughts’ and 
‘feelings’, in their typical meanings, might not feature as prominent thematic 
dimensions.  Alternatively, probes were frequently given regarding specific key 
terms emerging within the participants’ accounts, seeking further elucidation as 
to their significance.  Following Smith et al. (2009), I avoided making 
interpretations, reflections, or connections in response to interviewee’s accounts. 
 
After the interview was finished, time was allocated to de-briefing.  This involved 
asking participants about their experience of the interview (including determining 
whether any distress had been caused) and sharing further information about the 
project, including, if participants were curious, the reasons for my personal 
interest in the topic.  Most participants indicated that they had found the interview 
challenging but interesting, and all indicated an interest in receiving a copy of the 
completed thesis.  Follow-up contact was made with one participant who 
appeared to find the interview emotionally difficult.  On follow-up, the participant 
stated that she did not feel that her response to the interview had been ‘an 
issue’, and that she felt that continuing reflection on the interview was providing 
her with some personal understandings of her experiences.   
 
2.5 Data Analysis 
2.5.1 Rationale for Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
The present research focused on an exploration of participants’ experiences, 
and, thus, necessitated a phenomenological approach.  The researcher’s 
ontological position is influenced by Heidegger’s (1996) hermeneutic approach, 
according to which the objects of experience are always already constituted as 
interpreted.  Moreover, following Gadamer (cited in Moran, 2000), the 
interpretation of discourse always implicates and requires assumptions held by 
the researcher – research involves a ‘double hermeneutic’ (Smith & Osborn, 
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2003).  An openly reflexive hermeneutic phenomenological method was, 
therefore, necessitated.   
 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was chosen as the most 
appropriate method.  As a phenomenological approach, IPA focuses on the 
disclosure of the central dimensions of participants’ experiences of specific 
phenomena through thorough thematic analysis of interview transcripts (Smith et 
al., 2009).  As a hermeneutic method, IPA conceptualises research as a process 
of contextualised interpretation, rather than a pursuit of ‘objective’ knowledge.  
Findings implicate the researcher as well as the data itself, and so IPA requires a 
reflexive account of the research process.   
 
Certain aspects of the present study are, nonetheless, unconventional within IPA 
research.  First, as noted above, the sample included individuals both with and 
without an ASD diagnosis, and the data has been analysed collectively as a 
single body.  This contrasts with the convention within IPA of using maximally 
homogenous samples, in accordance with the method’s focus on meaning as 
always contextual (Smith et al., 2009).  Second, no assumptions were possible 
about the definition of the phenomenon under investigation, “closeness”.  While 
IPA involves the bracketing of assumptions regarding the specific meanings of 
experiences for participants, the vast majority of IPA research has been carried 
out on phenomena for which some definition can be assumed, such as physical 
pain (Osborn & Smith, 1998), relationship endings (Larkin, Watts,& Clifton, 
2006), or sexual experiences (e.g. Lavie & Willig, 2005).  The research has, 
therefore, necessitated an interrogation of the very phenomenological essence of 
“closeness” for the participants. 
 
As suggested above, the use of a mixed sample is particularly valid where the 
research question concerns the very nature of an experience, as commonalities 
across different participants’ accounts come to differentiate the essential from the 
incidental.  Equally, the use of a diverse sample may help to illuminate essential 
differences between the experiences of different groups; in the terms of the 
present project, the possibility is left open that the term ‘closeness’ may emerge 
as signifying different phenomena across an eclectic body of individuals.  Such 
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an approach is not without precedent within IPA.  Larkin and Griffiths’ (2004) 
investigation of “risk” using IPA involved a mixed sample of bungee jumpers and 
ecstasy users, highlighting both commonalities across all individuals, as well as 
differences emerging between and within groups.  Smith et al. (2009) also argue 
that research using two different groups of participants may lend weight to the 
analysis of a phenomenon through triangulation. 
 
It had been originally planned that the data would be analysed as two separate 
sets, with a secondary analysis of commonality and difference between the 
groups.  However, prioritising the interpretation of each participant’s data as part 
of an “autistic” or “neurotypical” set risked obscuring common threads uniting 
participants between these groups, as well as diminishing diversity within groups.  
Furthermore, the analysis of data from individuals with an ASD diagnosis 
alongside data from non-diagnosed individuals is in line with the commitment of 
this research to disclose presence within the experiences of people labelled as 
autistic.  To analyse a narrative as already in some sense “autistic” would be to 
participate in discursive practices which, I have argued in the Introduction, risk 
negating the subjectivity of the individuals diagnosed – and would, furthermore, 
not be properly phenomenological.  Conversely, a collective analysis can allow 
individual narratives to speak in their own right, and for thematic links and 
distinctions to emerge fully in a “bottom up” fashion.  The open nature of the 
analysis, in which the identification of both commonality and difference was 
pursued, also accommodated the recruitment of a non-homogenous sample. 
 
One unexpected aspect of the final sample was its gender makeup: all but one of 
the final sample were women.  Given the significance of gender issues in the 
current understandings of autism, this called for a supplementary analysis, 
included at the end of the next chapter. 
 
The analysis was also influenced by the existential phenomenology of Heidegger 
(1996) and Sartre (1956).  Van Manen (1990) argues that the exploration of data 
in terms of existential dimensions of experience, including intersubjectivity, 
embodiment, and temporality, is a powerful means of revealing the core essence 
of phenomena, as well as identifying essential differences between phenomena.  
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For example, a recent unpublished doctoral thesis exploring the experience of 
“spirituality” for dying individuals used an existentially-informed 
phenomenological methodology to identify two distinct modes of being within 
which “spirituality” held essentially different meanings (Taylor, 2009).  Similarly, 
within the present research, a uniform understanding of “closeness” could not be 
assumed for all participants, and so an existentially informed approach was 
utilised to add depth to the analysis.  While existential thought is not integral to 
IPA, it is at its core phenomenological, and the employment of robust theoretical 
frameworks in the analysis is in accord with the “interpretative” aims of IPA, 
which seeks not only to “give voice” to experience but, moreover, to “make 
sense” of it (Larkin et al, 2006). 
 
As will hopefully have become clear in the Introduction, the nature of language 
formed a central consideration in the development of the research.  The research 
question concerned the essence of “closeness” as a signifier.  A central focus on 
language is perhaps more often associated with qualitative methods other than 
IPA.  Foucauldian Discourse Analysis as a method is highly concerned with the 
linguistic discourses from which qualitative data emerges or is constructed 
(Willig, 2008).  Conversation Analysis represents another method involving an 
intensive exploration of linguistic practice between individuals (Sidnell, 2010).  
However, the concerns regarding language that drove the development of the 
research were primarily phenomenological: the concern was to understand what 
participants’ language reveals about their lived experience.  An epistemological 
assumption is held that participants’ language was eminently revelatory of lived 
experience.  The critical orientation towards language was thus intended to 
enhance, rather than problematise, the phenomenological analysis.  It is 
nonetheless the case that the exploration of language poses questions 
concerning its social origins and relation to power and discursive practice, and 
some consideration to these issues is given in the Discussion. 
 
2.5.2 Analytic Procedure 
The transcripts were printed out with wide margins, read and re-read, with my 
own observations, reflections and queries being noted in a research diary (see 
next section).  IPA is an iterative process, in which interpretation of individual 
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elements of the text influences and is influenced by the interpretation of the 
whole of the text – a process common to all understanding that has been called 
the “hermeneutic circle” (Smith et al., 2009).  Therefore, it was only when I felt 
confident that I could bear the whole of a transcript in mind that I began an 
intensive, line-by-line reading, making exploratory comments and noting 
emergent themes in the margins.  Using a colour-coded system, I also noted 
remarks on the potential impact of the interview process on the data, points at 
which I was struck by a clear resonance or dissonance between a section of the 
transcript and another participant’s transcript, potential superordinate thematic 
interpretations, and existential dimensions of the texts.  My understanding of 
what constituted a “theme” was guided by van Manen’s (1990) description of 
themes as “the experience of focus, of meaning, of point... the form of capturing 
the phenomenon one tries to understand.” (p. 87) 
 
Upon finishing the annotation of an individual transcript, I moved directly to the 
following case, sequentially in accordance with the order in which I had 
interviewed the participants.  Each transcript was read as far as possible in its 
own terms, and I sought to find labels for themes that were in accord with the 
terms of each individual case.  While Smith et al. (2009) suggest collating and 
organising emergent themes before proceeding to subsequent transcripts, I felt 
in my own case that this could lead me towards prematurely formulating 
hypotheses regarding common thematic structures and reading subsequent texts 
in a confirmatory fashion.   
 
After all transcripts had been read, I worked individually through each transcript 
in the reverse sequence to the order in which they had been annotated, 
compiling a list for each transcript of emergent themes and noting each point at 
which they were manifest within the transcript.  As I found myself thinking about 
the themes spatially, for each participant, I printed out the lists of themes and cut 
out each theme label, placing these on a floorspace and arranging them 
according to apparent connections.  The juxtapositions reached included 
subsumption and merging of themes within dominant categories, the 
establishment of groups of distinct but related themes, and the polarization of 
dichotomous themes.  Thus, thematic “maps” were formed reflecting the 
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relationships between themes; I took digital photographs of these before typing 
up the organised lists of themes for each participant. 
 
When analysis was completed for all transcripts, the theme lists were reviewed 
alongside each other, laid out collectively on a large space, along with the 
separate body of notes made during the analysis.  In comparing themes across 
transcripts, I sought first to identify dominant and “master” themes disclosing 
phenomenological dimensions common to all cases.  However, I also was led by 
the data to identify themes common to some but not all participants which, 
although not generalised, were nonetheless essential to the understanding of the 
experiences of these sub-groups of participants.  In this latter process of 
identifying thematic distinctions, an understanding of the existential dimensions 
of differing themes proved highly useful.  The final set of themes was then 
juxtaposed in a table (given on page 42, below) outlining their respective 
relationships. 
 
2.5.3 Research Journal 
A journal was kept throughout the research process.  The entries document 
much of the process through which my reflections and thoughts regarding the 
data and the research process were worked out.  Notes were also made prior to 
and following interviews both to document and expand on my own reflections on 
the data, as well as to facilitate reflections on how my interviewing style may 
have affected the data, and to consider ways in which my approach could be 
improved upon.  A sample from the diary is given in Appendix H, below. 
 
2.6 Validation 
2.6.1 Data Quality Check 
As interviews were conducted in several formats, the resulting data were 
compared during the analysis.  The number and depth of the emergent themes 
was comparable for data derived from telephone, face-to-face, and online 
interviews. 
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2.6.2 Participant Feedback 
The issue of participant validation within phenomenological research is 
complicated.  Phenomenology assumes the primordial first-person givenness of 
experience (Zahavi, 2005), and phenomenological research relies upon 
introspection mediated through language.  As such, an argument can be given 
that the researcher should establish a dialogue with participants regarding the 
interpretation of their accounts, in order to establish the validity of the findings; 
van Manen (1990), in particular, advocates a dialogical approach in 
phenomenological research.  However, participant validation is not widely used 
in IPA.  As argued by Langdridge (2007), the pursuit of participant feedback on 
analysis is problematic even within a phenomenological framework.  Most 
significantly, Langdridge (2007) argues that, due to the nature of 
phenomenological analysis and writing, it is possible that participants may not 
recognise the interpretation as being reflective of their lived experience.  
However, this does not necessarily indicate error on the part of the researcher.  
Equally, it may reflect that interpretative phenomenology seeks to disclose a 
level of meaning apart from that which is explicitly present in participants’ original 
accounts.  Due to these concerns, as well as the limited scope and time 
availability for the project, participant feedback was not sought for the analysis. 
 
However, as detailed in section 2.4.3, the collection of participants’ accounts was 
seen as a dialogical process, and the validity of the original accounts was a 
prominent concern.  All participants were therefore invited to be in contact with 
any further comments or queries following the interview.  Only one participant, 
who had been interviewed by MSN Messenger, sent further comments a month 
after the interview via e-mail.  As the participant indicated that she felt the 
comments were necessary to provide a complete account, these were included 
in the analysis of the data from her interview. 
 
Furthermore, all participants were offered copies of their interview transcripts, 
which five accepted; comments were invited on the transcripts.  Two participants 
provided minor corrective comments on transcript errors; these did not affect the 
analysis. 
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2.6.3 Independent Audit 
Smith et al. (2009) argue that the research process must be transparent to 
demonstrate validity.  Accordingly, the findings of the analysis were reviewed 
with my research supervisor to verify that a coherent argument was being 
developed that constituted a valid interpretation of the data.  For the examiners’ 
review, Appendices I to L give an extract from an annotated transcript, compiled 
list of instances of emergent themes, a fragment of the physical thematic map, 
and final thematic analysis for one participant, to demonstrate the way in which 
the analysis was performed.  Analytic material of the data from first participant, 
“Emma”, was chosen, as the analysis both began and concluded with her data.  
All annotated transcripts, theme lists and maps are available to the examiner 
upon request. 
 
2.7 Reflexivity 
2.7.1 IPA as a Reflexive Method 
As a hermeneutic method, IPA is inherently reflexive, in so far as the process of 
interpretation relies upon the researcher’s own understandings pertaining to the 
object of inquiry (Biggerstaff & Thompson, 2008).  The double-hermeneutic 
cannot and should not be regarded only with suspicion as an obstacle to 
“objectivity”, as it forms the very vehicle of communicative disclosure of the 
phenomenon.  However, interpretation is also a process of “conversation” in 
which the researcher must continue to pose questions regarding the data and his 
understanding of it.  In turn, the process of discovery through research may be 
transformative for the researcher (van Manen, 1990).  I therefore felt that an 
explication of my own pre-conceptions regarding certain central phenomena prior 
to the analysis was necessary to monitor for overly biased readings of the texts.  
In this section, therefore, I will give a personal account of my preconceptions of 
“closeness” and “autism” as held at the start of this study; I will return to these in 
the final chapter to consider their relationship to the findings. 
 
2.7.2 Reflexive Notes on “Closeness” 
I suspect that the vast majority of individuals – with notable exceptions - would 
consider closeness to a loved other to be vital to a happy, fulfilled life, but that 
the precise meaning of closeness might vary considerably across individuals.  A 
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personal fascination with close dyadic relationships (parental, romantic, and 
friendly) has deeply influenced my approach to psychology; indeed, it played a 
determining role in my decision to pursue clinical psychology as a career path.  I 
am, as such, highly invested in the meanings I assign to “closeness”.  My 
assumption at the start of the study was that, essentially, a close relationship is 
constituted through the experience of the other having an intimate sense of the 
quality of one’s own being – that the other has a sense of “what it is like to be 
you” – and, naturally, that this is reciprocal.  This meaning is carried over into my 
understanding and evaluation of closeness in my own personal relationships.   
 
2.7.3 Reflexive Notes on “Autism” 
That I have a longstanding interest in autism will be unsurprising in light of the 
fact that I have a younger brother who has been diagnosed with ASD.  I have 
not, to my knowledge, often consciously used theories of autism to understand 
him, and, moreover, his own development has been remarkable in that, as an 
adult, he no longer meets the diagnostic criteria.  Nonetheless, it has become a 
topic of great personal interest to me.  While I am not a great advocate of 
psychiatric discourse, autism has often struck me as a construct with 
considerable power to illuminate experiences affecting diagnosed persons which 
they may have difficulty articulating in the absence of a diagnosis.  I believe 
firmly that autism should be understood as an issue of difference, rather than 
purely of disability.  I have often found the “mindblindness” hypothesis (Baron-
Cohen, 1997) a useful tool for understanding autistic individuals.  Accordingly, I 
anticipated initially that autism would pose profound challenges for the 
establishment of closeness (in the highly mentalistic meaning to which I had 
assigned it).  I remained open to the possibility that “closeness” might hold 
essentially different meanings for autistic individuals relative to those not 
diagnosed.   
 
However, in the process of developing the project, my consideration of the 
dominant discourses surrounding autism called into question many of these 
assumptions, as will hopefully have become apparent in the previous chapter.  
This led me to adopt a position of greater curiosity, and a wish to avoid 
prematurely foreclosing my understandings of the experiences of people 
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diagnosed autistic by allowing assumptions regarding the differences signified by 
autism to run ahead of my interpretation.  
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3. Findings 
This chapter opens with an overview of the participants’ relationship and 
demographic backgrounds, and a brief summary of the dominant themes 
emerging from the analysis.  Detailed explication of the dominant and 
subordinate themes is then given, with illustrative extracts from the data and 
explicatory commentary. 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Participants 
Emma 
Emma is a white British woman, aged 49, who has been in a relationship with her 
partner, Michael, for 22 years, although they have been separated at points 
during this period.  They live together with their two children.  Michael was 
diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 2009.  Emma was interviewed in person. 
 
Anthony 
Anthony is a white British man, aged 69.  He married his wife, Lina, who is from 
East Asia, twenty years ago, and they share a home in her country.  They have 
no children together, but Lina has a family from a previous marriage.  Anthony 
was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 2009.  Anthony was interviewed in 
person. 
 
Margot 
Margot is a 59 year old white British woman who has been in a relationship with 
her partner, Adrian, for 13 years; they have lived together for the past 12 years.  
Neither have any children.  Adrian was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 
2003.  Margot was interviewed over the telephone. 
 
Stephanie 
Stephanie is a Jewish-Scottish woman, aged 34, who has been in a relationship 
with her partner, Kevin, for just under three years.  They live separately but see 
each other at regular times during the week.  Stephanie received a diagnosis of 
Asperger Syndrome in 2008, a few months prior to starting her relationship.  
Stephanie was interviewed over the telephone. 
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Sarah 
Sarah is a white English woman, aged 31, who has been in a relationship with 
her partner, John, for 12 years, and has lived with him throughout their 
relationship.  Her partner has two adult sons, one of whom lives with them.  
Sarah was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 2010.  Sarah was interviewed 
over MSN Messenger. 
 
Gemma 
Gemma is a 26 year old white British woman who has been in a relationship with 
her partner, Karen, for three years; they have lived together since 2010.  Gemma 
was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome at the age of 21.  Gemma was 
interviewed over the telephone. 
 
Caroline 
Caroline is a 38 year old white British woman who has been in a relationship with 
her husband, Will, for nine years.  They have a six year old son together.  Will 
also has two sons from a previous marriage, who live some distance from 
Caroline and Will.  Will was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 2006.  
Caroline was interviewed in person. 
 
Jane 
Jane is a 53 year old white English woman who has been with her partner, 
Stephen, for twenty years.  They live together, but neither partner has children.  
Stephen was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome in 2011.  Jane was interviewed 
in person. 
 
Table 1, overleaf, gives a summary of the demographic information for each 
participant. 
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Name Age / Age Group Ethnicity Diagnosis 
Emma 49 White British None. 
Anthony 69 White British Asperger Syndrome 
Margot 59 White British None. 
Stephanie 34 Jewish-Scottish Asperger Syndrome 
Sarah 31 White English Asperger Syndrome 
Gemma 26 White British Asperger Syndrome 
Caroline 38 White/Caucasian British None. 
Jane 53 White British None. 
Table 1.  Participant demographics. 
 
3.2 Presentation of Transcript Material 
The data was transcribed according to the guidelines suggested by Banister et 
al. (1994), with some additions.  IPA is a method concerned chiefly with the 
semantic content of data (Smith et al., 2009), and so detailed information 
regarding the duration of pauses, intonation, and stutters has not been included 
in the transcription.  In order to present interviewees’ comments accessibly, brief 
validating interjections by myself (e.g. "mhm", "yeah", "okay", etc.) have been 
omitted in the excerpts given.  However, pauses during interviewee's speech, 
clear emphases placed on particular words, and repetitions of words have been 
preserved, where significant for the interpretation.  Bracketed full stops and 
ellipses signify brief and extended pauses, respectively.  Un-bracketed and 
square bracketed ellipses indicate where, respectively, a brief or substantial 
section of the quotation has been omitted as not directly relevant to the thematic 
analysis in which it has been included.   
 
3.3 Overview of Findings 
The analysis uncovered three "master" themes: "closeness as authenticity" 
(Theme I), "discovering the partner" (Theme II), and "autism and difference" 
(Theme III).  These themes pervaded the data set, and were central to the 
interpretation of all participants' experiences.  The themes are explored below in 
order of their hermeneutic priority, as the interpretation of each latter theme 
requires an understanding of previous themes.  Each master theme gave rise, in 
turn, to sub-themes, vital to the interpretation of groups of participants’ data, but 
not necessarily present for all interviewees.  It was at the level of these sub-
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themes that some distinctions emerged between the diagnosed and 
undiagnosed participants.  An overview of the full thematic findings is given in 
Table 2, overleaf.
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Master Themes Subordinate Themes 
I. Closeness as authenticity 
 
I.a Validation of the self 
I.b Sharing experience 
II. Discovering the partner 
II.a Discovery and diagnosis 
II.b Action as revelation 
II.c Exclusivity 
III. Autism and difference 
III.a Autism, adjustment and 
authenticity 
III.b Autism facilitating closeness 
 
Table 2.  Overview of master and subordinate interpreted themes.
 
 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Theme I: Closeness as Authenticity 
The central dimension of closeness, common to all participants, is the experience 
of being able to express freely one’s needs and desires within the context of the 
relationship; closeness represents essentially an authentic mode of being.2  The 
participant's experience of her partner gives rise to the possibility for the self's 
deepest needs to be expressed freely and with security in the understanding that 
these will be understood and responded to in an attuned manner by the other.  
The expression of the self consists in part in a sharing of knowledge, but an 
                                            
2	  Although	  my	  interpretative	  approach	  has,	  as	  noted,	  been	  influenced	  by	  existential	  theory,	  the	  meaning	  
of	  the	  term	  “authenticity”	  here	  is	  quite	  distinct	  from	  its	  use	  in	  Heidegger	  (1996).	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active dimension of closeness is also revealed - the authentic self is expressed 
through activity:   
 
Jane: We can assert our needs, opinions, preferences, et cetera, and the 
other person will hear them...I can live more freely, more authentically... 
 
Anthony: I think closeness involves...doing what you feel you want to, rather 
than what you feel you should do. 
 
In describing this authenticity, each participant contrasted closeness directly with 
forms of self-consciousness and self-adjustment characterising other, less close 
relationships.  Closeness thus provides a release from the constraints of ordinary 
relating.  The reliance on the use of contrasts shown by each participant appears 
not to be solely descriptive in purpose, but rather reveals that an essential 
element of the experience of closeness is its difference from other modes of 
intersubjectivity.  Already within the quotation given above from Jane, we see the 
use of comparative language as integral to her description of closeness.  
Stephanie’s account of closeness resonates in its portrayal of closeness as a 
respite providing a “little bit of normality”: 
 
Stephanie: ...it's something that I've aspired to have...just this little bit of 
normality where...I don't have to think about it in a conscious way...so that 
things happen in a certain way.  I just want it to happen naturally. 
 
The breadth and lack of exact detail in the comments that have been given is 
demonstrative of how closeness is not, at core, constituted in specific acts, but as 
a mode of being.  Ordinary relationality emerges as a state of effort in which the 
self must be controlled and adjusted in line with external demands; closeness, by 
way of contrast, is characterised by a lack of self-adjustment, wherein what is 
expressed is in harmony with one’s own constitution, or, in Stephanie’s terms, 
“nature”.  While the detailed accounts given of specific experiences of closeness 
varies markedly between participants, the understanding of closeness as a state 
of authenticity thus reveals this diversity to be nothing less than a reflection of the 
individuality of each participant. 
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Relationality is, within all participants’ accounts, intimately tied to a self-concept – 
identity is experienced with what is expressed within a relationship, such that the 
self-adjustment within ordinary, distant relationships constitutes the playing of a 
role of someone else.  Anthony, for example, spoke of his efforts to make himself 
acceptable to others as “wearing the mask.”  By contrast, within closeness, the 
open expression of “inner” experiences and needs gives rise to an experience of 
“being” one’s “true self” 3 within the context of the relationship.  In Gemma’s 
account, we again see closeness as a state in congruence with one’s “nature”: 
 
Gemma:  When I say “being yourself”, nobody – it’s a very private thing, 
nobody else gets to see that...that’s how I get to be my real self, with her – 
that’s me in my purest form...That’s a natural thing that goes with loving 
somebody. 
 
Again, for all participants, closeness, as authenticity and freedom, is a state of 
potential for activity.   The self is expressed in so far as the self's way of acting 
within the context of the relationship is felt to be in accord with one's needs and 
desires.  The self is not, however, static, but subject to change and open, 
potentially, to discovery and growth.  Security in the acceptance of the self by the 
partner gives rise to freedom to explore new modes of being; where these come 
to be experienced as in line with the self’s developing constitution, and are 
expressed before the partner as witness, the experience of authenticity is also 
one of personal growth: 
 
Margot:  The closeness [is] really the understanding...of who we are, and we 
shouldn't... change that, and falsify that... We allow each other to be poles 
apart.  And that's never happened to me before, so I've been able to 
develop more as a person - be able to go and do different things, and come 
back and tell him about them. 
 
                                            
3	  I	  should	  stress	  that	  “true	  self”	  is	  meant	  here	  in	  a	  phenomenological	  sense;	  it	  is	  the	  individual’s	  
experience	  of	  authenticity	  that	  is	  being	  indicated.	  	  No	  statement	  is	  made	  here	  regarding	  “true	  self”	  as	  a	  
psychological	  construct.	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The quotation again reveals the essentialist dimension of closeness – each 
partner has a certain mode of being which is who he or she is; the self cannot be 
“changed” without being falsified.  Yet, through novel action witnessed by the 
other, the self can be transformed. 
 
The self is, then, for both the diagnosed and the undiagnosed participants, 
intrinsically intersubjective, existing for and through the other.  However, in more 
detailed considerations of the ways in which the experience of the other gives 
rise to authentic being, subtle distinctions emerge between participants with and 
without a diagnosis.   
 
3.4.1.1 - Theme I.a: Validation of the Self 
Within the accounts of participants with a diagnosis of ASD, a central aspect of 
closeness is the validation of the self.  Although, as already noted, an experience 
of acceptance by the other is a universal condition of closeness, within the 
accounts of the diagnosed participants, priority is given to evaluative aspects of 
closeness.  The experience of the self being fully revealed and, in turn, positively 
valued and desired by the other, allows an experience of the self as valuable and 
valid: 
 
Stephanie: It makes me feel...more valid that there is somebody who 
actually cares enough about me to give up their weekend every weekend. 
 
In the revelation of the authentic self before a partner, the self is made profoundly 
vulnerable to the other’s response.  The way in which a partner responds to the 
self becomes experienced as an authoritative evaluation of the self.  Closeness, 
thus, involves an objectification of the self – in the revelation of one’s authentic 
being, the participants identify with the self as observed and responded to by the 
other.  As illustrated by Stephanie’s quotation, validation often centres upon the 
other responding to the self with desire.  For Anthony, central to the significance 
of a failure to maintain closeness with his wife is her lack of desire for his 
“presence”, which, in turn, constitutes a categorical statement upon himself as “a 
disappointment”: 
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Anthony:  I think most people want to feel wanted...that the other partner 
appreciates their presence... and that they're pleasing the other partner... a 
general feeling that (.) your presence is doing some good for the partner... 
And I feel selfish... It's a failure to please the other partner... I am a 
disappointment...  
 
The revelation of the self to the other is entwined with complex preconceptions 
about the nature and acceptability of the self.  Each of the diagnosed participants 
describes a history of rejection by others which has, at times, led them to 
question the acceptability of their selves to others.  Accordingly, the validation 
provided in closeness may represent a reconciliation to the self.  Gemma 
describes the significance to her of an occasion on which Karen invited her 
brother and his partner along on a holiday, a situation which potentially left her 
vulnerable and exposed to their reactions to her atypical behaviour.  The 
confidence shown in her by Karen represents a transformative statement on the 
value of the self: 
 
Gemma: It made me feel...that I wasn’t a bad person.  That I wasn’t a 
malicious person and that they realised that any behaviour that I presented 
wasn’t out of malice or out of me being a bad person, it was just part of my 
condition. 
 
Gemma’s account resonates with a description given by Stephanie of a struggle 
with periodic “meltdowns” in which she loses a sense of control over her actions 
and vents her anger verbally in ways of which she is later ashamed.  She is 
astonished to find that her partner remains with her even in the immediate 
aftermath, conflicting with expectations connected with her conception of herself: 
 
Stephanie:  I'm flabbergasted!  ...I'm just completely taken aback that he's 
still there... It makes me happy...that he's still accepting me...that I am 
accepted...I'm not a bad person... He still wants to be with me... 
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In either account, the partner’s response is seen as an objective statement on the 
self; a judgment is made about what the self “is” (or “is not”).  Moreover, the 
other’s gaze gives rise to a transformation of the self – she is “not a bad person”. 
 
Conversely, closeness poses the risk that the other’s reaction will be overly 
congruent with distressing concepts of the self.  Sarah’s partner John regularly 
provides her with practical help, due to difficulties she can have in daily living.  
While she describes not ordinarily reflecting upon the significance of being cared 
for, an awareness of having an impact on John can elicit a painful experience of 
her self-concept.  Again, the experience of the self is of the self before the other: 
 
Sarah: I take it for granted sometimes, but I notice when he gets stressed... 
when I do think about it after, I feel bad, guilty...and then I feel flawed I 
guess, it’s demeaning... 
 
In the accounts of the undiagnosed participants, the theme of validation is more 
latent or absent, and evaluative descriptions of the self are marginal.  This is not 
to suggest that the experience of being known and desired by a partner is not 
significant for these participants, but rather suggests that, for them, it may be less 
central specifically to the experience of closeness within the relationship. 
 
3.4.1.2 Theme I.b: Sharing Experience 
Within the accounts of the undiagnosed participants, a more central dimension of 
closeness is the sharing of experience.  A sense is given of the self and partner 
experiencing an event in the same way.  For these participants, such sharing 
constitutes a core personal need, essential to living in the fully authentic manner 
required of closeness.  Furthermore, an intimate sharing of experience can allow 
either individual in the relationship to respond to his partner in an attuned 
manner, not only emotionally, but also in practical ways which make it more 
possible for the partner to exist freely and authentically. 
 
Emma gives as an example of a time when she had felt close to Michael an 
occasion on which both had succumbed to laughter as they searched in vain for 
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their vehicle in a car park.  Her language captures the sense of identical 
intentionality: 
 
Emma:  ...by the third time it was just hysterically funny that we 
were...thinking the car was going to be there, and it wasn’t there.  And, the 
both of us laughed, laughed, and laughed ourselves up.  In fact, I think I was 
just rolling on the floor by the end...Um, and he was laughing, too... I think it 
was that...I experienced it as us both sharing the same thing.  We both 
found it as hysterically funny... 
 
The emphasis on laughter provides a revelation not only of shared cognition, but 
also of affect – the situation has the same effect over both partners.  A focus on 
laughter also resonates with the theme of closeness as a release from the 
necessity for control – Emma is incapacitated in a safe and enjoyable way.   
 
Other accounts of sharing retain the sense of the focal experience being given 
primarily to one partner, but known intimately, in turn, by the other – the essence 
here is of selves knowing and being known to each other through the sharing of 
experience, rather than the partners’ phenomenal worlds being identical.  Such a 
process of exchange can be asymmetrical, and participants’ accounts vary in the 
extent to which priority is given to the self’s understanding of the partner versus 
the partner’s understanding of the self.  Caroline’s description of the significance 
of focused conversations on philosophical topics of deep significance and interest 
primarily to her partner suggests a predominant focus on the experience of the 
other, but also a utilisation of his “special interest” as a gateway to reciprocal 
exchange: 
 
Caroline:  Well, for me, it’s understanding just what’s going on in his 
mind...it’s about respecting each other’s intelligence and boundaries, and 
understanding what’s going on with each other. 
 
The sharing of experience is not only about comprehension, but is also tied to 
responsive action – the partner who shares in the other’s experiences responds 
in a congruent fashion.  This can involve verbal acknowledgement and validation 
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of a partner’s experience.  However, equally significantly, a partner may take 
steps to make adjustments for the partner in accord with her needs.  The 
resulting experience is one of deep attunement – not only the partner, but the 
environment is felt to resonate with one’s needs, and relief is experienced from 
the need to adjust the self in line with the environment.  Jane describes 
Stephen’s deep understanding of her experiences in terms that suggest an 
experience not only of his subjective attunement, but, moreover, of an 
environment provided by the partner in which she is freed from ordinary 
constraints: 
 
Jane:  A specific example of closeness would be shared laughter about 
something... a shared reaction to an injustice that we’d either experienced, 
either individually, or together...the mirroring is almost non-verbal...I 
wouldn’t ever have to say to Stephen, “Can we sit quietly now?”, or “Can we 
have a chat now?”  It happens... There’s a harmony there – that’s another 
word for “closeness”, I suppose. 
 
The attunement of either partner to the other’s experience, and the 
responsiveness demonstrated, is, within closeness, understood to be 
authentically in accord with his or her nature.  This pertains equally when the 
participant describes the sharing of experience within her relationship to be 
asymmetrically focused on her partner.  Margot described her deep awareness of 
and attendance to Adrian’s needs as reflective of her own inherited nature, and, 
thus, as an authentic mode of being: 
 
Margot:  It’s almost choreographed, but there is a radar between us... It’s 
not quite pipe and slippers, you know, when he comes home, but I think, 
“Today it’s been very hot, Adrian feels the heat terribly – I’ll have the cool, 
cool air flowing through the house.” [...] 
 
Interviewer: What is it about those experiences that...allows you to feel 
close to him? 
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Margot: Because...it’s supportive.  I suppose, coming from a family of 
servants, as I have...I’ve always had this thing about doing things for others. 
 
3.4.2 – Theme II: Discovering the Partner 
The experience of the other’s intentionality towards the self – as witnessing, 
understanding, and accepting; as desiring or sharing in experience – is central to 
the ability to freely express the “authentic” self.  How, then, does this knowledge 
of a partner develop?  Each of the participants illustrates ways in which their 
understanding of their partners emerges over time, and almost all acknowledge 
that their understanding of the other can still be doubted or errant; for some 
participants, a full understanding of the other continually eludes them.  In order to 
be known, then, the partner must be discovered. 
 
The way in which knowledge of the other emerges varies between participants, 
and, at times, within individual accounts.  Verbal disclosure plays a central role 
for all participants – and, yet, more frequently emerges as a means for 
participants making themselves known to their partners than vice versa.  
Partners’ own words often appear secondary to their actions as a means of self-
revelation.  Words and speech can even exist in tension.  For Stephanie and 
Kevin, the meanings of words are less important than the way in which they are 
given, and both are ultimately secondary to the demonstration of affection 
through the simple act of being present:   
 
Stephanie:  He’s never said “I love you” first... So, when I’m feeling 
insecure, I’ll say “Well, you never say ‘I love you’... I don’t think you care 
about me that much.”  But he says, “Well, the fact that I’m here shows that I 
do.” ...I think that we both have that similarity, that, “The fact that I’m still 
here, shows that I care!” 
 
All participants give statements indicating an awareness that what is experienced 
as “knowledge” of the other constitutes an interpretation influenced by the self, in 
particular by emotions, prior experience, and, indeed, choice.  Emma speaks 
reflectively of her evolving understanding of Michael over the course of their 
relationship.  She comes to the understanding, over time, that the ways in which 
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she experienced Michael early in the relationship as sharing in affective 
experience was reflective of her own pronounced feelings of love.  Moreover, 
what she comes to learn about him changes her understanding of the 
significance of his earlier emotional displays: 
 
Emma:  So, at the initial stages of our relationship, I’m being in love and 
doing all those heightened emotional things, Michael will be responding 
back with them, and...when that decreased...those emotions weren’t coming 
from Michael any more.  Because, possibly...they’d just been reflected 
back... I can see... that, when he’s in the company of other people... (.) he 
takes on their emotions. 
 
For all participants, then, knowledge of the other’s intentionality is an integral 
dimension of closeness, and yet emerges as a potentially fallible interpretation.  
The individual is required to “make sense” of some aspect of what is seen in the 
other, in order to experience closeness.  In the modalities through which the other 
is revealed and interpreted, differences emerge between the diagnosed and 
undiagnosed participants, as demonstrated in the first two subordinate themes. 
 
3.4.2.1 Theme II.a: Discovery and Diagnosis 
The diagnosis of ASD represents for all participants a transformation in the 
understanding of the person to whom it is applied, whether it is the participant 
herself or her partner.  The diagnosis emerges as revelatory of a significant 
dimension of the individual’s nature.  However, the significance of the revelation 
proves different for those to whom it had been applied than for undiagnosed 
partners.  For the participants with a diagnosis, the predominant theme is of 
explanation and validation, and less emphasis is given on the significance of the 
diagnosis within the context of the relationship.  For undiagnosed participants, 
however, the central significance of diagnosis is as a means for interpreting the 
intentionality of the person to whom it pertains.  The exact nature of the 
difference disclosed through diagnosis will be explored in the discussion of 
Theme III.  What I aim to outline here is the way in which diagnosis serves as a 
means of revelation. 
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The undiagnosed participants give accounts of, in the development of their 
relationships, finding aspects of their partners’ behaviour frustrating and difficult 
to interpret.  Moreover, each of these participants makes statements to the effect 
that some of their partners’ behaviour could be interpreted, according to the 
typical way in which others are understood generally, as uncaring.  Diagnosis, in 
this context, signifies that a different framework is needed for making sense of 
their partners, and the associated theory and “expert” knowledge serves as a 
means for re-interpreting what their partners’ behaviour reveals about their 
intentionality.  Intriguingly, the hermeneutic significance of diagnosis is analogous 
to a “theory of mind” – it plays a role specifically in the understanding and 
interpretation of the other’s actions.  For Emma, diagnosis thus provides an 
interpretative structure – a “language” – within which the significance of a 
partner’s behaviour, which she did not previously possess a means of 
comprehending, can be understood anew: 
 
Emma:  I think, (.) it just provides a (.) language?  It provides some way of 
understanding a person who’s behaving in a way that’s out of my 
experience of the world...when we had the language of Asperger Syndrome, 
and how people with Asperger Syndrome behaved, we could then put his 
behaviour in that context, rather than it be the behaviour of somebody who 
didn’t give a damn. 
 
For Jane, who actively sought out a diagnostic assessment for her partner, 
diagnosis had great significance for its implications as to whether her partner, in 
demonstrating what appeared at times to be a callous lack of concern, was 
behaving as he did by choice: 
 
Jane: ...a realisation that, I have felt quite isolated in some ways... For a 
while, I thought he was being a bloody minded male, or he was trying to 
control, or being difficult...I realised, it’s something more than that, it’s about 
lack of capacity. 
 
While, as already noted, the diagnosed participants spoke of the diagnosis 
having its primary significance outside the context of the relationship, a congruent 
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theme emerges in that the diagnosis can constitute a means for communicating 
to the partner the intentionality underlying their own “autistic” behaviour: 
 
Sarah: I think he thinks it explains why I act differently to people, how I can 
get lost in something I'm doing and [abandon] everything else, he always 
used to get very frustrated that I had trouble with food and he's a fair bit 
more understanding now…and things I do like my OU stuff, he helps me 
with the phone calls and organisation of things, he understands why I 
constantly lose track of day and date of the month, and why I get angry at 
things being hard. 
 
The revelation of the other’s intentionality can, for some participants, facilitate the 
sharing of experience so central to the undiagnosed participants’ understanding 
of closeness.  Each of the undiagnosed participants indicated an awareness that 
their partners experienced people and environments in different terms to 
themselves.  The shift towards interpretation of the partner’s behaviour through 
an understanding of ASD thus discloses previously concealed aspects of their 
experience.  Typical examples include an awareness of a partner’s difficulty 
interpreting others’ behaviour, and heightened sensitivity to stimuli.  Diagnosis 
may thus constitute a gateway into sharing the other’s experience of the world 
through revealing qualitative differences in the way in which either partner 
understands their surroundings.  For Margot, this awareness allowed her to gain 
a greater sense of being part of Adrian’s “world”: 
 
Margot:  So, it took me a long time to think, “Oh!  There are other 
environmental factors that get in the way of what he wants to do, which are 
seriously affecting him, which are real, which are huge, which I don’t even 
see or notice because I don’t have the same sensory things that he does.” 
...It’s nice to, sort of, be part of his world... 
 
As noted in theme I.b, the ability to share in a partner’s experience facilitates an 
actively attuned orientation towards the other.  Caroline’s account illustrates how 
the illumination of a partner’s intentionality through diagnosis can provide a 
framework for orienting the self in relation to him: 
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Caroline: I realised that...I’d been getting really angry with him for being 
awful in supermarket – because the lights and the noise and everything!  
And he’d start shouting things out involuntarily.  Rather than getting 
angry...[I] could just get Tesco’s to deliver, or...if I could sense that he was 
gonna go into one of his [makes explosion sound]...to either try and calm 
him down, or prepare for it...It was almost like I could go and look for a tool-
kit to be able to deal with it. 
 
In this quotation, and elsewhere, we also see a reference to the relevant literature 
on ASD as the window shedding light upon the partner’s intentionality, and, in 
Caroline’s case, constituting a “tool-kit” for guiding attunement to the other. 
 
3.4.2.2 Theme II.b: Action as Revelation 
If, for the undiagnosed participants, the behaviour of their partners can be difficult 
to interpret, for the diagnosed, the other becomes manifestly known through his 
actions.  While verbal self-disclosure does feature as significant in some of these 
participants’ accounts, narratives of specific events and periods in which the 
participants experience closeness to their partners centre on actions by the other 
through which a manifest acceptance and positive regard for the self is 
demonstrated.  Anthony describes a brief relationship outside of his marriage in 
which mutual action for the pleasure of either partner formed the basis of 
closeness and validation: 
 
Anthony:  Everything seemed very good because we were both (.) working 
towards trying to please the other…during the initial stages, we had, we had 
our common ideas to please each other, and we were pretty close, at that 
stage...I felt that there was a future… 
 
The partner’s actions are experienced as demonstrating the partner’s investment 
in the self, through efforts to please or provide care, making sacrifices, or taking 
risks for the sake of the participant.  For Stephanie, it was a small, unexpected 
gift from her partner during a routine shopping trip that first allowed her to feel 
close to him, through the care and desire it demonstrated: 
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Stephanie:  The fact that he’d done this to make me smile was just, you 
know, I actually try not to cry thinking about it.  It was just really (.) lovely...I 
felt really close to him at that point...I just thought it was really considerate 
and generous and kind, and that he cared enough about me to want to 
make me happy...That’s why it meant so much, because, during my whole 
life, I’ve been with men who have just taken everything. 
 
In this quotation and elsewhere, we also see how the significance of a partner’s 
actions emerges in part through a manifest difference to earlier experiences.  
Each of the diagnosed participants recounts a history of interpersonal difficulties, 
such as mistreatment by romantic partners, difficult relationships with family 
members, and a perceived requirement to hide or conceal aspects of the self.  
Closeness thus represents a new way of experiencing a partner.  The revelation 
of this difference emerges in the participants’ accounts through specific events in 
which their partners act in ways which break with expectations developed through 
previous relationships.  Gemma describes being moved by her partner’s 
attendance at a talk she gave at the National Autistic Society: 
 
Gemma:  ...she sat in the front row, and then straight after she told me that 
she felt like she was going to cry when I’d done my talk... That’s something 
that my parents have never said, and never done... That made me feel 
really close to her. 
 
The differing modalities through which a partner comes to be understood among 
the participants in part reflects the different forms of the other’s intentionality 
involved in distinct meanings of closeness.  For those participants for whom 
closeness centres upon the sharing of experience, a necessity exists to gain a 
sense of the phenomenal world of the other.  Where the validation of the self is a 
more primary concern, the other’s intentionality is understood foremost in terms 
of positive regard, concern, and desire – elements of intentionality intimately 
connected with action.   
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The finding that the diagnosed participants experienced their partners as fully 
revealed in their actions, while the undiagnosed participants make use of formal 
knowledge frameworks to interpret the other, appears at first glance paradoxical.  
However, the accounts given suggest implicitly that, for the diagnosed 
participants, the actions of their present partners can be understood through the 
same framework used to interpret the actions of others in general.  The difference 
manifest in the actions of the other from earlier experiences reveals 
straightforwardly a different, more positive intentionality towards the self than 
previously encountered.  In contrast, the problem for the undiagnosed 
participants leading to the need for a formal framework of knowledge to interpret 
their partners is that their autistic partners’ actions appear to require a different 
framework for interpretation than that used for others in general. 
 
3.4.2.3 Theme II.c – Exclusivity 
The revelation of the other allows the experience of an exclusive relationship, in 
which the self is privy to knowledge not shared beyond the couple.  Seven of the 
participants gave indications that this exclusivity formed an integral element of 
closeness; while Anthony emerges as an exception, this likely reflects the focus 
within his account on the difficulty of achieving closeness, with limited 
experiences through which to explore achieved exclusivity.  The sharing of 
vulnerable or potentially shameful information which is secure only within the 
trusted bounds of the relationship is a prominent aspect of this theme.  However, 
the exclusive sharing of knowledge, understandings, and even resources, 
constitutes in and of itself a foundation of closeness, beyond the specific 
emotional valence of what is shared. 
 
A central dimension of exclusivity is the privileging of the self – the participant, in 
sharing something exclusively with the partner, holds a special and privileged 
position before the other.  Caroline describes the significance of her partner Will 
allowing her to share his possessions – something he is loath to do with others: 
 
Caroline:  I know that when he allows me to...share something... I find that 
quite, really, because he’s allowed me to do something that he probably 
 60 
 
wouldn’t allow any other human being to do... so, that makes me feel quite – 
quite privileged! [laughs lightly] 
 
Exclusivity can also constitute a validation of the self, following on from themes of 
the autistic participants’ experiences discussed earlier.  Such emerges in 
Gemma’s comments on the meaning of sex between Karen and herself.  A 
mutual, exclusive gaze, encompassing the whole of both partners, allows a 
transformation and validation of self and other.  Interestingly, what is shared is 
not only understanding, but rather a whole identity, known only to Gemma: 
 
Gemma:  During sex, it’s a time when you both let your barriers down.  And 
she’s a person that...that person is...someone who I only, really, get to 
see...nobody else gets to experience that... So, that makes me feel really 
close to her as well.  It all comes back to being valued, and being special, 
and I must be important to her, if she feels that comfortable to let her guard 
down. 
 
Humour emerges as a particularly significant form of exclusive sharing.  The 
significance is not simply that partners are able to enjoy laughter with their 
partners, but that they are able to do so in an exclusive way – through laughing 
together at things that other individuals would not: 
 
Margot:  You’ll feel like you’ve got a little club member, don’t you, if you 
laugh at something?  You’ve got that, that person understands me, they’re 
on the same wavelength. 
 
Gemma:  ...ways that we bond together...the inside jokes that we have with 
each other, about the dog – things that other people wouldn’t find funny... 
 
Amidst subtle distinctions in these remarks, a common dimension emerges of 
laughter as a mark of exclusivity.  Margot’s remarks are particularly illustrative of 
the importance of shared humour, as earlier in the interview she stated directly 
that she and Adrian “could never be on the same wavelength.”  Humour is thus 
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revealed as a disclosure of shared, affectively charged intentionality.  
Interestingly, this dimension is not explicitly commented on by Gemma. 
 
3.4.3 – Theme III: Autism and Difference 
All participants understand ASD as a diagnosis signifying lifelong behavioural, 
cognitive, and emotional traits of the individual to whom it is applied.  The 
accounts given of the significance of the diagnosis focus on the recognition of the 
limits of change that can be expected.  ASD as a diagnosis thus signifies 
essential differences between the partners in these “mixed” relationships.  An 
array of responses are shown to diagnosis, ranging from an embracing of the 
explanation and potential validation it can provide, to accounts that resemble 
narratives of mourning.  For all participants, the various traits which lead to the 
diagnosis hold implications for the prospects of establishing closeness within the 
relationship. 
 
For the ASD participants, the central significance of the traits associated with 
autism is the potential unacceptability of the self to others.  These individuals 
spoke of difficulties in finding social acceptance, due to showing behavioural 
differences such as obsessional routines or high degrees of anxiety, difficulty 
finding others with similar interests, and also due to vulnerability to being mislead 
and manipulated by others for their own gain.  The responses of others to these 
differences thus represent an obstacle to the achievement of authentic being in 
which all aspects of the self are expressed and revealed to a partner.  
Interestingly, while remarks are made by these participants regarding difficulties 
in social comprehension and communication, these do not emerge as the central 
interpersonal challenges.  Rather, the narratives reveal a theme of the 
concealment of the self before the powerful gaze of others.  For Anthony, the 
requirement is to play the role of someone else: 
 
Anthony: In many ways, it’s been more of a pretence than a real doing what 
I wanted...I’ve experienced it more recently since diagnosis, and I’ve met 
other Aspies and talked to them about the way they put on a mask, they 
don’t be themselves.  They have to say what they think the other person 
would like to hear.  I can see that I’ve done that myself...I am forced to talk 
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about trivial things.  I haven’t been relaxed doing what I would (.) [sigh] want 
to do...I think wearing the mask is a bit wearing, it’s a wearing activity, that 
you can only maintain for so long.   
 
A “mask” is not only “worn”, but also wearing, a demanding effort that cannot be 
infinitely sustained, and which is incompatible with the free expression of the self.  
Equally, however, articulating what is desired also appears effortful and painful; 
recognition of that which Anthony is wanting is itself a recognition of his ordinary 
mode of relating as one of lack. 
 
For the undiagnosed participants, diagnosis creates an awareness that their 
partners’ essential make-up means that they will be unable to meet some aspects 
of their essential needs.  Most particularly, the participants find that their partners 
are less able to share, or share in, their experiences, including understanding and 
empathising with the undiagnosed partner’s emotional experiences.  Jane 
described her relationship with Stephen as one ordinarily of deep harmony, and, 
yet, prone to sudden disturbing lapses in Stephen’s attunement: 
 
Jane:  ...when the ten per cent gets wrong, wrong, it’s very wrong, and I 
think a lot of that is to do with (.) his (.) neuro-biological status. [...] When it 
doesn’t happen, it’s almost shock, surprise, horror.  “What’s going on 
here?...My soulmate doesn’t see it the same way!” [...] It’s almost like being 
tipped out of bed, when you’re tucked up, asleep, warm and cosy, and 
somebody tips you out of bed – it’s quite a shock… 
 
The interruption of shared experience is experienced as a casting out from a 
state of assumed harmony and rest.  Significantly, within the moment of conflict, 
Stephen is not constituted as “a man with Asperger’s”, but as her “soulmate” - 
and so, with the implication that Stephen, as Jane’s soulmate, should “see it the 
same way”, the experience is an awakening to difference.   
 
3.4.3.1 – Theme III.a: Autism, Adjustment and Authenticity 
For either partner, the differences highlighted by diagnosis thus present a 
challenge for the achievement of authenticity.  For the diagnosed, aspects of the 
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self which have led to social difficulties are felt to be innate and unalterable, and 
for the undiagnosed, diagnosis signifies that limits will always exist in the ability of 
their partners to share experience.  A need for adjustment to the conditions of the 
relationship is thus experienced – yet, this is at odds with authenticity as a core 
condition of closeness.  A complex, at times dialectical, relationship emerges 
between the demands for adjustment and authenticity. 
 
Undiagnosed participants describe an awareness of the necessity for adjustment 
within their relationships due to the limits of their partners’ being.  However the 
undiagnosed partners also feel a need for experiences to be shared by an 
attuned partner, and to abandon this need would be to live inauthentically.  A 
double-bind can thus present in which the context of closeness creates a longing 
for authentic expression of the self and sharing of experience, yet present 
alongside this is an awareness of the limitations of the partner.  A primary 
experience is, accordingly, frustration.  For Jane, the awareness of Stephen’s 
limitations provided by the diagnosis creates an uncomfortable demand for 
adjustment.  The double-bind leaves questionable even the legitimacy of her 
feelings of frustration: 
 
Jane:  I suppose...I’m quite a self-aware person, it does help me deal with it.  
But other days, I don’t want all that knowledge, I just want to be (.) my 
feelings. [...] It’s almost like, it’s almost like a conceited, it’s – I think, “Gosh, 
it’s me that’s got to do the compensating behaviour.” 
 
For the diagnosed participants, a central concern is the limited possibility of 
change; a challenge is present in the need to authentically express their needs, 
including those reflecting traits associated with the diagnosis, in the presence of 
doubts about the acceptability of these to the other.  To conceal the self is both 
an unsustainable effort and incompatible with closeness.  Anthony’s differences 
from his wife have ultimately led to them living separate lives, due to an inability 
to sustain pretence of feelings he did not possess.  In contrast, the three female 
participants each speak of the need to account for themselves to their partners, 
to proactively make known their whole selves to them, in order that the self be 
observed, understood, and accepted as it is, including seemingly unalterable 
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traits.  Verbal explanation of the self, informed by information about the 
diagnosis, can play an essential role.  For Gemma, communication protects both 
her partner and, implicitly, herself from “surprises”: 
 
Gemma:  I thought that I owe her to be honest...and explain to her what my 
life is like and the difficulties that I have.  So that, when we moved in 
together, and...made a commitment to be together, that nothing was a 
surprise.  So, literally anything and everything, which I think can get quite 
tiresome for her, is talked about. 
 
For the diagnosed participants, then, a pressure can be experienced towards 
self-adjustment that, as self-concealment, is incompatible with closeness.  
However, the tension between adjustment and authenticity is not, for all 
participants, irresolvable.  For some undiagnosed participants, compensatory 
behaviours towards the other could constitute a non-ideal, but, ultimately, 
functional route towards eliciting attunement within a partner – authenticity can be 
deferred, but not abandoned.  Caroline, for example, finds that proactively 
making her needs explicitly known to Will, while an effort, ultimately allows her 
needs to be met: 
 
Caroline:  If I have to go through the trouble of explaining everything that I 
need...it is really frustrating.  But then, I know that I’ll get my emotional 
feedback, then, sometimes you just have to grit your teeth and force 
yourself to do it...I think when it works is when we’re both thinking, 
considering what we need to do.  When it doesn’t work is when we’re just 
mindlessly falling through it, and not really thinking about what we need to 
do...this relationship takes a lot more effort than any other relationship that 
I’ve had...but I really want to make it work. 
 
What is revealed as most fundamental to the establishment of closeness here is 
not an immediate harmony between the authentic self and other, but the potential 
for this to exist.  Effort and “thinking” are portrayed here not as natural 
components of closeness, but, nonetheless, as a means to achieving potential, 
driven through a basic desire to achieve closeness to a partner. 
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In a more fundamental way, for some participants, both diagnosed and 
undiagnosed, aspects of the adjustments required by their relationships disclose 
new ways of being and relating which come to be experienced, in time, as 
integral to the self.  The tension between adjustment and authenticity becomes a 
creative dialectic: adjustment gives rise to new forms of authenticity.  For 
Stephanie, the challenge to manage her responses to Kevin’s failure to “adhere 
to routine” represents a process of personal growth; her self is not concealed, 
but, within limits, transformed: 
 
Stephanie:  There are a lot of times where he doesn’t adhere to my routine, 
or he doesn’t adhere to things that I need to be in a certain way because of 
how I, I know that I react, but, I guess, in a way, that that’s him just teaching 
me to be a little bit more patient, and a little more adaptable as time goes 
on. 
 
For Margot, the very meaning of “closeness” has changed through her evolving 
experience of the relationship.  An expectation of natural resonance in 
experience has been surpassed by an embrace of partnership and the discovery 
of the value of difference: 
 
Margot:  It’s different with an Asperger’s than with a neurotypical...it’s not 
the same closeness at all.  There’s a huge difference...I can never, ever be 
on the same wavelength as Adrian...but we’ve got a sort of equality, 
respectful thing going on.  [...] I felt like I was always having to adjust 
myself...or having to adapt, and I didn’t know why...  It’s fine for me to go off 
and do something else...It’s quite a revelation actually... We’re a jigsaw 
puzzle which can detach, and do detach quite a lot... 
 
Separateness is constitutional to this mode of closeness; the integrity of self and 
other allows individual exploration.  A transcendent mode of closeness 
characterised by a pre-reflective sharing in experience is surpassed by the 
disclosure through difference of the self and other as essentially separate, yet 
also equal in validity and mutually reliant. 
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3.4.3.2 – Theme III.b: Autism Facilitating Closeness 
Despite each participant illustrating ways in which ASD posed challenges for 
closeness within their relationships, an emergent theme within the experiences of 
most participants is of aspects of autism, within certain contexts, actively 
facilitating closeness.  The specific ways in which this possibility emerges varies 
substantially between the participants, but a common experience is of a harmony 
between the traits associated with the diagnosis and the respective needs of both 
partners, such that ASD is understood as an aid to the development of closeness 
within the relationship. 
 
Several of the participants describe autism not only in terms of difficulties, but 
also in terms of areas of relative strength – commenting, for example, on their 
own or their partners’ abilities in memory or logic.  These strengths are, for a 
subset of participants, resonant with the needs of both partners and so directly 
facilitate experiences of closeness.  For example, Gemma describes how her 
“Asperger’s logic” in problem solving allowed her to respond to Karen when she 
was struggling emotionally with work and family difficulties, allowing both for her 
partner’s needs to be met, as well as for Gemma to gain a sense of self-
validation: 
 
Gemma:  The reason that I like to comfort Karen is because I know it makes 
her feel better, but it gives me a purpose as well...like I’ve got value...She 
was starting to become fixated, and worrying a lot about people around her 
passing away...So, I was able to sit down with her and go through the 
cognitive-behavioural therapy that I had before, and bring some of my 
Asperger’s logic into it...That made me feel really good about myself, and 
really confident that she wasn’t going to have to go through that...distress. 
 
The tendency of individuals diagnosed with ASD to develop “special interests” 
and routines also provide, for some participants, a way in which to live 
harmoniously together.  Stephanie’s clear routines, around which her interactions 
with Kevin are planned, provides a clear structure within which to share a life: 
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Interviewer: Can you tell me about specific ways in which you experience 
closeness with Kevin? 
 
Stephanie: ...there’s things, like we have – well, he knows that I have my 
routine, and he fits himself into that routine...I expect him to be here by six 
o’clock on a Saturday night, and he always is...We’ve developed a mutual 
routine...He’s become more part of my life. 
 
The dialectic of adjustment and authenticity emerges in that the routine is 
experienced as now part of both partners’ way of life – what was in some sense 
originally Stephanie’s own inner need has become something both she and Kevin 
have mutually developed and share in. 
 
Interpreting these accounts at a dyadic level, recalling the distinct dimensions of 
closeness identified in the accounts of diagnosed and undiagnosed participants, 
the possibility emerges that the interactions recounted may have congruent but 
distinct significances for either partner.  In Stephanie and Gemma’s quotations, 
we see accounts of the ability to freely express aspects of the self and gain self-
validation; yet, it is also possible to hypothesise that, for their partners, these 
interactions constitute a means of sharing experience.  In line with this 
hypothesis, Caroline provides an analogous account of engaging in deep 
philosophical conversations with her partner, Will.  While the topic of discussion is 
given as a “special interest” for Will, for Caroline, the conversations also allow an 
opportunity for a deep sharing in experience: 
 
Caroline:  Will’s very interested in...philosophical stuff...So, when we have 
very deep conversations about that, and really think, and really think, and 
really focus on what we’re talking about, really focus on each other, then 
that’s quite intimate, that’s quite close. 
 
It is not only autistic traits that allow ASD to be experienced as facilitating 
closeness.  The sharing of the life challenges endured by the individuals 
diagnosed can also give rise to a sense of bonding and partnership.  The 
quotation from Gemma given earlier in this section gives a hint of this experience 
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– her own struggles, which led her to receive CBT, have in turn allowed her to 
empathise with Karen and share her experience.  Sarah also gives an emotive 
account of bonding through shared struggle.  Her account is distinct amongst the 
experiences of the diagnosed participants in the priority given to shared 
understandings of emotional experience; yet, the focus is on the sharing of 
struggle – both Sarah and her partner have endured significant life challenges 
associated with medical or psychiatric difficulties.  Despite a profound discomfort 
with her diagnosis and a desire to overcome the difficulties associated with 
autism, the life challenges she had endured, alongside her partner’s own 
difficulties with illness and alcohol use, ultimately draw them closer together: 
 
Sarah:  It adds closeness because all the elements we’ve shared have 
emotions to them...sort of moves things to a level where you are tied 
together – and then there’s the life we’ve shared, and all the bad things 
we’ve got over, makes me feel like we can get through anything. [...] The 
closeness and security and trust are worth so much, because otherwise, all 
this misery would be for nothing...it’s the sticking together when its bad that 
is more important than being able to ride out the good times. 
 
3.5 Remarks on Diagnosed Female Participants’ Accounts 
The unexpected gender balance among the participants provides an opportunity 
for some concluding remarks on the accounts of the three female participants 
with a diagnosis of ASD. 
 
The thematic analysis given in this chapter discloses the core facets of the 
phenomenological significance of closeness equally for these participants and for 
the male diagnosed participant Anthony.  Closeness to their partners emerges as 
a mode of active, authentic being in which the true self is revealed before a 
partner, who responds through actions which demonstrate acceptance of and 
desire for the self, giving rise to an experience of validation.  None of the 
participants spoke directly about the personal significance of being a woman with 
an ASD diagnosis. 
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What emerges as distinctive for the three female participants is the concern 
voiced in their accounts about their acceptability to their partners due to their 
awareness of differences associated with the diagnosis, such as unusual ways of 
relating socially, meltdowns, and repetitive behaviours.  The women’s accounts 
gave considerable focus to how these differences were viewed by others, rather 
than their meaning in terms of the women’s intentionality; others’ responses to 
the differences appeared to take priority over the participants’ own 
understanding.  While Anthony spoke of his experiences “wearing a mask” to 
make himself acceptable to others, for him this was due to a discrepancy 
between his own interests and neurotypicals’; the difference is thus experienced 
as rooted in his own intentionality and agency, rather than in seemingly 
uncontrollable atypical behaviours.  Furthermore, each diagnosed female 
participants articulated an understanding of herself as inscrutable to others; the 
behaviours that made them different were seen not to be readily understood by 
others.  A common experience for each of these participants was, accordingly, 
shame. In this context, the experience of reconciliation to self, described in 
Theme I.a, becomes central to the meaning of closeness.  In these women’s 
accounts, a sense emerged of their experiences closeness to their current 
partners defying expectations developed through prior painful experiences; a 
surprising and transformative dimension to the experience was revealed.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that the understanding of closeness as an experience 
of either partner being privy to exclusive knowledge about the other (Theme II.c) 
was clearly evident in the accounts of each of the diagnosed women, but was 
absent in Anthony’s account. 
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4. Discussion 
Within this chapter, an overview is given of the relationship between the findings 
of the analysis and the research questions.  Consideration is given to the 
implications of the findings for theory and practice, and to future directions for 
research.  The chapter ends with a discussion of the validity and limitations of the 
study, reflexive notes on the role of the analyst, and a consideration of the 
challenge posed by poststructural theory to the claims of the research. 
 
4.1 Relation of the Findings to the Research Questions 
Question One: In what ways is closeness understood and experienced by either 
partner in romantic relationships in which one has been given a diagnosis of an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder? 
 
The central dimension of closeness, for all participants within the present study, 
was the experience of authenticity before a partner: closeness is manifest in so 
far as the individual feels able to freely express and make known their needs and 
desires with the knowledge that these will be understood, accepted, and 
responded to by a partner in an attuned fashion.  An experience is given rise to of 
the individual “being” his “true self” within the context of the relationship.  
Closeness is a state of potential activity: the self is expressed through action, and 
the demand to act in a way discordant with one’s needs is experienced as a 
distortion of self.  Closeness thus represents a release from the self-
consciousness and self-adjustment required in ordinary modes of 
intersubjectivity.   
 
Distinctions emerged between participants with and without a diagnosis in what 
was required for authentic relating.  For the participants with a diagnosis, 
closeness represented primarily a validation of the self.  The individual is able to 
act in accord with their own needs and desires before another who witnesses, 
understands, and continues to desire the self.  The partner’s positive 
intentionality is revealed through actions demonstrating an investment in and 
desire for the self.  These participants had all experienced significant social and 
romantic difficulties, and thus this validation could also give rise to a positive 
transformation of the self-concept.  Within the accounts of participants without a 
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diagnosis, the theme of validation was latent or absent.  Rather, authenticity 
within closeness involved the expression of a need to share experience – to 
understand an experience as being given identically to the self and partner, or for 
one partner within the dyad to have a deep insight into the experience of the 
other.  The sharing of experience is deeply tied to a partner’s responsive action, 
which frees the self and/or partner from the need to make adjustments and 
enables either to live more authentically. 
 
Question Two:  In what ways is the experience closeness facilitated or hindered 
for either partner? 
 
Question Three: In what ways, if any, is autism experienced as a phenomenal 
object affecting closeness within the relationship? 
 
It was necessary to distinguish between these two questions in planning the 
research, as the project involved an inquiry into the experience of closeness, 
beyond its specific relationship to autism.  However, as the analysis shows the 
participants’ understandings of ASD to be closely interwoven with experiences of 
closeness, these research questions will be considered here together. 
 
A central condition for closeness as authenticity is an experience of mutual 
understanding between self and other: that the self is known, understood, and 
accepted by the partner.  Moreover, the other must be experienced as known in a 
mode appropriate to the participant’s understanding of closeness.  For diagnosed 
participants, narratives of experiences of closeness centred upon partners’ 
actions which demonstrated an understanding and desire for the revealed self; 
these frequently were characterised by explicit contrast with negative 
expectations of others developed through previous aversive social experiences.  
In undiagnosed participants’ accounts, closeness was facilitated through finding 
ways of sharing experience; this could involve a sense of natural congruence 
between the self and other’s experience of the world, using communication and 
knowledge of the diagnosis to gain insight into their partners’ experiential world, 
or finding a common experiential focus in line with a partner’s “special interest”.   
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A key challenge to establishing closeness emergent in the accounts of 
undiagnosed participants was in partners not sharing, or sharing in, experience; 
this included, but extended beyond, a perceived lack of empathy.  Within the 
context of the interview, participants often gave an understanding of these 
difficulties in terms of the diagnosis; autism was understood as imposing 
limitations on their partners’ ability to share in experience.  However, within the 
narratives given of the immediate experience of partners not empathising or 
sharing in experience, the partners’ behaviour was in the first instance 
understood in terms of subjectivity and choice.  A sense was often betrayed that 
the diagnosed partner was in some sense choosing not to share in experience or 
provide a desired level of intimacy.  Frustration was, accordingly, a common 
element of the narratives. 
 
For the diagnosed participants, the central challenge to establishing closeness 
was a concern with the acceptability of the self.  Within these participants’ 
accounts, a common theme was the anticipation that, due to differences 
experienced as beyond the individual’s control, frequently associated with the 
diagnosis, the self was unacceptable, or even burdensome, to the other.  Where 
participants came to understand their partners as accepting and desiring the self, 
surprise was often experienced.   
 
An emergent theme across both diagnosed and undiagnosed participants was 
that certain aspects of the diagnosis required either or both partners to make a 
particular effort to ensure that both individuals’ needs were met.  The lack of a 
natural propensity towards empathy or sharing of experience, or the perceived 
unacceptability of aspects of the self, necessitated work within the partnership.  
While this effort was experienced as a self-adjustment, and thus in tension with 
the need to exist authentically with the partner, it was the case that some 
participants felt that, while their needs were, at times, deferred, they were 
ultimately met.  In other cases, the adjustments required within the relationship 
constituted a process of personal growth and a change in what was understood 
as authentic being for the self.  For diagnosed participants, the defiance of an 
expectation that the self would be unacceptable or intolerable for the other could 
make closeness a transformative experience; prior negative expectations thus 
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enhanced the depth of the experience.  For either partner, the sharing of 
struggles which could be linked with the diagnosis could facilitate a sense of 
partnership and exclusivity.  Despite the potential for these challenges to 
ultimately facilitate closeness, for all participants, there was an understanding 
that there were limits on the extent to which the self could be adjusted without 
being negated, and, for some, an impasse was manifest in the struggle between 
adjustment and authenticity. 
 
Aside from the challenges and opportunities afforded by the traits associated with 
autism, diagnosis itself emerged as an important mediator of understanding.  A 
concern emerged within the accounts of both diagnosed and undiagnosed 
participants that autistic behaviours could ordinarily understood as signifying a 
lack of care.  The absence of an awareness of difference can obstruct 
communication regarding either partner’s understanding of the other, as basic 
understandings about the meaning of behaviour, or experience of the world, are 
assumed to be shared.  Diagnosis, therefore, illuminates differences and allows 
for renewed communication and new understandings.  Among the undiagnosed 
participants, a theme emerged of diagnosis constituting a window opening an 
avenue of communication through which the other’s experiential world could be 
understood.  Among diagnosed participants, diagnosis constituted a potential 
means of accounting for and validating difference. 
 
4.2 Implications 
4.2.1 Closeness 
The present interpretation of closeness has particular resonance with Prager and 
Roberts’ (2004) conceptualisation of intimacy.  Prager and Roberts argue that 
intimacy manifests through self-revealing behaviour, mutual positive involvement, 
and the experience of shared understandings of both partners’ inner experience 
(including not only thoughts and feelings, but characteristic rhythms, habits, and 
routines): “Intimate relating is, at its core, two selves knowing each other.” (p. 46)  
The authors suggest that a core condition for intimacy is congruence between an 
individual’s self-concept – the schematised representation of the self – and her 
organismic self – the first hand experience of “inner” self-states, including 
thoughts, beliefs, and desires.  Correspondingly, within the present findings, 
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closeness necessitates a congruence between the subjective sense of self and 
the self as revealed to and known by the other, such that what is expressed is 
experienced as “authentic”.  As the present researcher’s understanding of 
closeness prior to the analysis was quite distinct from Prager and Roberts’ 
conceptualisation, the emergence in this study of a resonant phenomenological 
interpretation derived from an independent, ‘bottom-up’ analysis constitutes a 
strong endorsement of the central tenets of their model. 
 
The present analysis also discloses phenomenological dimensions of closeness 
not fully addressed by Prager and Roberts (2004).  Within the present 
interpretation of closeness, a core emergent experiential dimension for both 
diagnosed and undiagnosed participants is the active self: within the security that 
the self is known and accepted by the other, a freedom emerges for the self to 
express needs through activity.  This finding represents a contribution to the 
perhaps overly restrictive focus within existing approaches to closeness on the 
mutual knowledge of self and other.   The present findings also suggest that, 
phenomenologically, the experience of the other within closeness assumes 
different dimensions depending on the core meanings closeness holds for an 
individual.  Where the central dimension of closeness is the validation of the self, 
the other’s intentionality is understood in terms of knowledge of and desire for the 
self.  Where the sharing of experience is a prerequisite to authenticity, the 
understanding required of the other’s intentionality is more focused on the nature 
of his or her experience of the world.   
 
A more ambiguous relationship emerges between the present analysis and the 
“self-expansion model”.  Aron et al. (1991) argue that closeness represents the 
integration within the self of elements belonging properly to another.  According 
to the model, within a close relationship, an individual comes to experience the 
world pre-reflectively in such a way as she understands it to be experienced by 
her partner.  In line with this model, the present analysis disclosed the sharing of 
experience as a central dimension of closeness for undiagnosed participants.  
However, distinctions emerge between the model and the present analysis.  First, 
the sharing of experience is of more marginal importance within the accounts of 
the diagnosed participants.  Second, phenomenologically, the experience of the 
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distinction between self and other is integral in the present analysis to sharing – 
the experience is understood in the participants’ accounts as being given 
separately to either partner, and secondarily disclosed to the other.  It is 
important to note that the “self-expansion model” centres on a cognitive, rather 
than phenomenological, conceptualisation of the self, with the assimilation of the 
other representing a shift in automatic pre-reflective processes, which, it could be 
argued, would not emerge at a reflective phenomenological level.  However, Aron 
et al. (2004) do appeal to the phenomenological theory (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 
2002) in support of their theory.  This mixed employment of cognitive and 
phenomenological accounts requires conceptual clarification.   
 
Finally, in contrast to the demands of quantitative research, an advantage of 
qualitative methodology is sensitivity to the vicissitudes of language.  The present 
research has identified not only a common framework within which the 
experiences of the participants can be understood – “closeness as authenticity” – 
but has also disclosed differences in the meaning of closeness between groups 
of participants.  “Closeness” thus emerges as a signifier which can hold different 
meanings.  This suggests a significant limitation in the practice within closeness 
and intimacy research of attempting to measure the quantity or quality of 
closeness present within relationships according to singular definitions of these 
constructs.  According to conventional approaches, the intimacy achieved by 
some of the participants in this study might be assessed as “lesser” in depth or 
quality, while according to the present analysis, qualitative differences may also 
be manifest between individuals and couples.  The pursuit of singular definitions 
of a construct such as closeness (or intimacy) may, therefore, risk negating and 
pathologising difference; research in this area may thus benefit from the adoption 
of a more pluralistic approach. 
 
4.2.2 Autism 
One of the most interesting aspects of the diagnosed participants’ accounts is the 
concern expressed regarding the other’s view of the self: these participants were 
highly concerned with aspects of the other’s intentionality, particularly as it 
reflected on the acceptability of the observed self.  Prima facie, this contrasts 
markedly with dominant approaches to autism which conceptualise the condition 
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as one of impairment in adopting an intentional stance (Baron-Cohen, 1997), 
and, moreover, as involving impairments in self-referential cognition (Lombardo & 
Baron-Cohen, 2010).   
 
In interpreting this contrast, we must first note that the phenomenological focus of 
the present study is distinct from the cognitive concerns of the dominant 
paradigm in autism research.  Cognition and experience are related but distinct 
objects of inquiry, and straightforward inferences cannot be made about one on 
the basis of an interpretation of the other.  Yet, such a category error is 
characteristic of a trend within autism literature.  Baron-Cohen (1997), for 
example, suggests that intimacy may be beyond most autistic individual’s 
capacity, due to the necessity of “feeling as if you really know the other person’s 
thoughts” (p. 142).  What the present study suggests, however, is that the 
veracity of cognition must be distinguished from the affective significance of 
associated experience.  To suggest that an autistic individual may be less able to 
infer accurately intentional states in the other is not to suggest that an autistic 
individual cannot have the experience of “knowing” the other, nor that this 
experience will be of lesser import or intensity.  The contrast between the present 
phenomenological data and dominant cognitive models of autism therefore 
argues for the importance of maintaining rigour in distinguishing between 
cognition and phenomenology. 
 
This analysis returns us to the consideration of paradigms of absence and 
presence discussed in the opening chapter.  To recap: the dominant approach 
within autism research is focused on absence: a concern to determine that which 
is lacking in those diagnosed as autistic, at the cognitive, neurological, and social 
levels.   This approach is valid, and has led to helpful therapeutic interventions for 
autistic individuals.  Yet, to say that social cognition is impaired in individuals with 
ASD is not to say that it is absent, nor even that it is of less concern to them.  
What the present research demonstrates is that intersubjectivity can hold 
profound meaning for individuals diagnosed with ASD; indeed, the qualitative 
meaning of a relationship shared considerable common ground with others who 
had not been diagnosed.  Even where difference emerges, it is a difference 
between two substantive phenomenological modes.  While there are levels of 
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meaning within the accounts of the undiagnosed participants which are absent 
from those of the diagnosed participants (such as closeness as the sharing of 
experience), the diagnosed participants’ accounts in turn foreground experiential 
dimensions which are in turn latent or absent within the accounts of the 
undiagnosed participants (most particularly, closeness as the validation of the 
self).  In all participants’ accounts, the intentionality of the other emerges as 
eminently present in the lived experience of closeness; this stands apart from the 
consideration of the accuracy with which the other is perceived. 
 
To date, the exploration of autistic presence has been mainly pursued within art; 
within Mark Haddon’s (2003) remarkable Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-
Time, for example, the reader is thoroughly immersed in the vivid experiential 
world of a boy we can only infer is autistic.  Within research, equally, an approach 
is required which will allow the construct of autism not to be confined to a 
negation.  Further work, both qualitative and quantitative, is required to give voice 
to the experiences and values of this population. 
 
The findings both resonate with and raise questions about the foregrounding of 
the “intentional stance” within autism research.  The central distinction between 
the understandings of closeness within the diagnosed and undiagnosed 
participants’ accounts is the importance within the latter of the sharing of 
experience.  This lesser priority given in diagnosed participants’ accounts to the 
other’s experience is congruent with Baron-Cohen’s (1997) suggestion that 
autism is characterised by a deficit in the ability to adopt an intentional stance.  
Even more striking is the resonance with Hobson’s (2002) argument that the 
central difference within autistic intersubjectivity is the relative absence of a 
propensity to be “moved” to orient the self towards the other’s experience.  In 
resonance with Hobson’s considerations on “being moved”, undiagnosed 
participants did not simply demonstrate a cognitive understanding of other’s 
experience; rather, a central priority was to enjoy the sharing of intentionality of 
an experience – a dimension latent or absent in autistic participants’ accounts.  
By contrast, Baron-Cohen’s (2003) emphasis on the centrality of affective 
empathy in intersubjectivity appears congruent but overly limited – empathy 
emerges as only one dimension of a broader understanding of closeness given 
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by undiagnosed participants as a process of each partner sharing in the other’s 
experience and responding in a congruent and attuned manner.   
 
However, the experience of the other’s intentionality is central in the 
understanding of closeness for all participants.  The findings provide an example 
of how the question of the qualitative meaning of lived experience stands apart 
from questions regarding the veracity of interpreted meaning; that which is 
present within lived experience retains its significance despite research which 
may question its veracity or cognitive complexity.  Closeness, in its central 
dimension of authenticity, does not appear to require the inference of complex 
mental states characterised by the “as if” quality which is attained in the 
intentional stance proper (Dennett, 1987).  While dominant autism research 
maintains a myopic focus on “theory of mind”, as argued by Zahavi (2005), 
complex mentalization of the other appears phenomenologically secondary to 
more basic modes of intersubjectivity.  Autism research may, therefore, benefit 
from utilising models of social cognition encompassing different modalities of 
intersubjectivity. 
 
4.2.3 Closeness in the Context of Autism 
4.2.3.1 Theory 
The present research suggests a number of challenges that may emerge in the 
context of a close romantic relationship in which one partner has a diagnosis of 
ASD.  For partners with a diagnosis, the knowledge that the self can be known, 
understood, and accepted by the other may be difficult to achieve.  For 
undiagnosed partners, a difficulty may emerge in the inability or reticence of the 
diagnosed partner to understand and share in their experience.   
 
A limitation of existing research on autistic intersubjectivity is that it has generally 
focused on identifying cognitive and behavioural differences between autistic and 
neurotypical populations, but little research has been conducted to date which 
explores directly the implications of these differences for the autistic individual’s 
effort to establish relations with others.  An emphasis on the cognitive modelling 
of autistic difference leaves unanswered questions as to the ordinary dynamic 
implications of difference within relationships.  Furthermore, this approach is 
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potentially disempowering in that it localises difference within the autistic 
individual.  The present research offers a demonstration of the utility of exploring 
data from individuals both with and without a diagnosis and juxtaposing these 
with parity, seeking to understand each as valid, and difference as existing 
between rather than within individuals. 
 
4.2.3.2 Practice 
When working clinically with either or both partners in the type of relationship 
which is the focus of this study, a common difficulty may be a discrepancy in the 
essential conditions for either partner to fully express themselves within the 
relationship.  Moreover, an impasse in communication may arise, such that the 
nature of these differences is occluded, due to a lack of an awareness of their 
nature, or even of their existence.  A twofold challenge is present for differences 
to be, first, communicated, and, secondly, navigated, in order that congruence 
within the relationship can be sought.  This focus on the acknowledgement and 
acceptance of difference is central to at least two forms of couple therapy, 
Integrative Behavioural Couple Therapy (Dimidjian, Martell,& Christensen, 2008) 
and Gottman Method Couple Therapy (Gottman & Gottman, 2008).  Although the 
present phenomenological research does not address “objective” dynamic 
processes, hypotheses may nonetheless be derived from the present findings 
regarding approaches couples from these groups may find beneficial when facing 
such challenges. 
 
In the absence of a signifier of difference, it may be difficult for either partner to 
infer the need for the communication of certain aspects of their experiential world, 
which may be simply assumed to be shared by the other.  The diagnosis of ASD 
itself thus represents a potentially highly valuable disclosure of important 
differences between partners in their modes of experience of the world (and each 
other), which can illuminate the need for more direct communication regarding 
each other’s respective experiences and needs.  Psychological theory 
surrounding the diagnosis may itself play a role, although caution must be 
exercised that neither partner is reduced to the presence or absence of a 
diagnosis, but, rather, understood in terms of their essential needs, which always 
transcend diagnostic categorisation.  Nonetheless, the present study suggests 
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that aspects of the “expert knowledge” pertaining to the diagnosis may disclose 
aspects of difference that partners can find difficult to identify and articulate 
independently.   
 
A particular area of concern may be the understanding of the diagnosed partner’s 
behaviour; frequently in the present data, undiagnosed partners made inferences 
about the meaning of their partners’ behaviour in terms of what it would typically 
be taken to signify (c.f. Bentley, 2007).  Intriguingly, however, the present findings 
suggest that the diagnosed partner may be less puzzled by the meanings of her 
partner’s actions, as what is sought by the present participants is a manifest 
expression of acceptance, investment, and desire, which can be readily inferred 
by direct displays of care and affection.  Cognitive-behavioural strategies for 
exploring the meanings attributed by either partner to the other’s behaviour, or for 
understanding how one’s behaviour might be understood by one’s partner 
(Baucom, Epstein, LaTaillade,& Kirby, 2008) may therefore be helpfully informed 
by information regarding the diagnosis.  Such work to make known either 
partner’s experiential world may in itself constitute a means of experiencing 
closeness, through allowing both the sharing of experience, as well as revelation 
and validation of the self.  Care should be taken that difference is not localised 
within the diagnosed partner, as both will have meaningful understandings of 
closeness which are valid in their own terms. 
 
Differences being made manifestly known, a second challenge is to explore the 
potential for congruent expression of both partner’s needs within the relationship.  
The accounts included in the present study illustrate how congruence can 
emerge even where the experiences through which partners’ needs are met are 
interpreted in very different ways by either partner.  For example, a discussion 
focused on a “special interest” can allow both for the diagnosed partner to freely 
express her interests, while also serving as a medium for a neurotypical partner 
to make known and share inner experiences.  However, the recognition, in some 
instances, that either or both partner will not be able to freely express some 
aspects of their needs within the relationship may indicate the necessity of an 
adjustment of expectations; for some, difficult decisions about the sustainability of 
the relationship may be required.  Alternatively, questions can be raised about 
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the possibility of change.  Is the potential present for either partner to explore new 
ways of being within the context of the relationship which might be experienced, 
not as an effortful self-adjustment, but as a process of personal growth?   
 
Finally, clinicians should be sensitive to nuances in the language of closeness 
and intimacy, and take care that preconceptions as to the validity of the typical 
meanings assigned to these terms does not become oppressive, nor an 
obstructive to communication.  While some clinical researchers have 
recommended that the provision of a working definition of “intimacy” or 
“closeness” for couples can facilitate goal setting (e.g. Moss & Schwebel, 1993), 
the present findings suggest that the personal needs which clinicians attempt to 
signify universally through these terms can, in fact, vary significantly between 
different individuals and relationships. 
 
4.2.3.3 Autism and Closeness as Gendered Constructs 
As argued in the opening chapter, autism and closeness are gendered 
constructs.  While Baron-Cohen’s (2002) “extreme male brain” hypothesis may 
be controversial, it does highlight the overlap between autistic features and 
cultural ideas of masculinity.  Conversely, the construction of closeness (or 
intimacy) within research, with its focus on verbal sharing of emotive experience, 
falls within the arena of contemporary constructions of femininity (Wood & Inman, 
1993). With three out of the four diagnosed participants in the present study 
being female, the findings allow some consideration of the potential significance 
of gender in the phenomenology of closeness in the context of autism. 
 
Significant commonalities emerged among the accounts of the female 
participants that distinguished them from the one male participant.  Most salient 
was the finding that the diagnosed women were each acutely aware of the 
experience of being seen as different by uncontrollable traits associated with the 
diagnosis, such as anxiety, meltdowns, and interpersonal difficulties.  While the 
male participant described experiences of having to “mask” his difference and 
conform to social expectation, he alone articulated autistic difference as 
stemming from differences in interests and priorities he associated with autism 
(such as wanting to talk about weighty scientific matters, rather than trivia) – 
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differences that he suggested made him sometimes feel others to be inferior.  
That is, the male participant claimed a sense of agency and justification around 
that which made him differently.  In contrast, the female participants’ experienced 
gave greater priority to experiences of shame surrounding difference.  While 
none of the participants linked these experiences to gender, it is striking that only 
the male participant articulated significant congruence between his preferred 
identity and his autistic traits.  The possibility emerges from this that social 
constructions of gender may compound the sense of alienation for females with 
the diagnosis, as it will be more difficult for them, as women, to assume a social 
identity which can accommodate both autistic traits and socially sanctioned 
femininity.  In contrast, the development of such an identity within a woman’s 
social systems may facilitate an experience of positive connotations of autistic 
traits, as well as a sense of agency and validity in showing signs of autism.   
 
The participants’ understandings of closeness also hold gendered dimensions.  
The sharing of experience can be understood as a conventionally feminine 
priority in intimacy (Wood & Inman, 1993), and emerges as a central dimension 
of closeness for the undiagnosed participants, all of whom are female.  However, 
this theme was latent or absent in the accounts of the diagnosed participants, 
both male and female.  The diagnosed participants’ experience thus emerges as 
distinct from a mode of intersubjectivity that is both “neurotypical” and “feminine”.  
Recourse to a straightforward binarism which would in turn equate the “autistic” 
with the “masculine” is, however, precluded by diversity within the diagnosed 
participants’ accounts.  Most intriguingly, the understanding of closeness as a 
sharing of exclusive knowledge (Theme II.c), which also resonates with 
constructions of femininity (Wood & Inman, 1993), assumes greater prominence 
in the narratives of the female diagnosed participants, and is absent in the male 
participant’s account.  In this respect, the diagnosed women’s lived experience 
shows complex gendering, again posing questions as to the interface between 
autistic subjectivity and the social construction of masculinity and femininity. 
 
The director of autism research at Yale University, Ami Klin (as quoted in Murray, 
2008), has dubbed women with autism as “research orphans”.  The needs of this 
group remain extremely under-researched.  The present findings give some initial 
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evidence for the importance of constructions of gender in autistic identity, 
experience, and intersubjectivity. 
 
 
4.2.4 Further Clinical Implications 
Beyond work with romantic couples, the findings hold implications for direct work 
with people with autism, as well as with people to whom they are close, 
romantically or otherwise.  There is currently a very limited body of literature 
pertaining to clinical work with non-learning disabled adults with autism.  
However, recent work in this area has argued for the utility of cognitive 
behavioural work with this population, adapted to account for information 
processing differences associated with autism, and there is provisional evidence 
for the benefits of group CBT interventions for anxiety and social difficulties (see 
Gaus, 2011, for an overview). 
 
The present findings indicate important issues pertaining to social identity and 
self-esteem for this group.  The diagnosed participants each showed an 
awareness of differences in their interests, motivations, social engagement and 
behaviours from most of those around them.  Each of them was, in turn, highly 
concerned about others’ evaluations of them, such that their very experience of 
self was deeply affected by others’ judgments.  (Intriguingly, this would seem to 
run contrary to what might be expected under a condition of “mindblindness”.)  
The accounts given by several of these participants of a history of victimisation 
resonate with other research findings about the experiences of autistic individuals 
in adulthood (Kapp, Gantman, & Laugeson, 2011).  Both participants’ accounts, 
as well as my own experience during this project of engaging with diagnosed 
individuals in various forums, suggests that the experience of “being different” 
can lead for many individuals to profound questions about identity.  As such, 
direct clinical work with this client group needs to include consideration of social 
identity and self-esteem.  Perhaps due to the differing priorities of research which 
seeks to explain the nature of autistic difference, the clinical literature to date 
includes little reference to issues of identity and self-esteem, and these needs are 
not included in a recent overview of clinical applications of CBT with this group 
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(Gaus, 2011); the present research suggests, however, that these issues can be 
highly important. 
 
Clinical work can also include a focus on addressing interpersonal cognitive and 
behavioural difficulties which may pose barriers to inclusion (Kapp, Gantman, & 
Laugeson, 2011).  The present work suggests considerations that can be 
incorporated into clinical work addressing interpersonal difficulties.  
 
First, it should not be assumed that the opacity of other individuals’ minds will be 
an immediate concern for the client.  Within the accounts of the diagnosed 
participants in the present study, there was, somewhat unexpectedly, minimal 
reference to difficulties understanding others’ behaviours and intentions.  This is 
not to say that theory of mind issues are not central considerations in clinical 
work, but, where included in formulation and intervention, this may be challenging 
for clients if they have not previously understood their interpersonal difficulties in 
such terms.   
 
Second, the present research’s inclusion of the views of both diagnosed and 
undiagnosed individuals illustrates the importance of attending to the meanings 
assigned to difficulties at a systemic level.  When describing barriers to the 
experience of closeness, the undiagnosed participants’ accounts suggested that 
their partners’ difficulties in empathising and sharing experience were frequently 
interpreted as indications of a lack of interest or concern.  Congruently, three of 
the diagnosed participants were particularly concerned about others’ perceived 
inability to understand the meaning of their own atypical behaviour and its relation 
to the diagnosis.  The findings illustrate how the interpersonal challenges need to 
be understood in a genuinely intersubjective context, and direct work may benefit 
from including individuals to whom the client is close, in order to consider the 
meanings that arise in relation to difficulties at a systemic level.  Systemic 
interventions may not only help the diagnosed individual to consider others’ 
minds, but may furthermore allow them greater insight into his or her own. 
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4.2.5 Directions for Future Research 
There remains a dire need for more research into the romantic experiences of 
individuals with autism and their partners.  Quantitative research is required to 
establish the scale of need and outcomes at a population level.  Research may 
address the degree and variability of satisfaction of different needs connected 
with closeness, such as sexuality and empathy, and the correlates of positive and 
negative outcomes, both in terms of traits of either partner as well as in the 
specific strategies pursued within relationships.  However, further qualitative work 
is required to provide a conceptual framework within which quantitative data can 
be interpreted in terms of the lived experiences and values of these populations.  
The present research has focused on the meaning of participants’ experiences; 
an alternative qualitative approach, such as grounded theory, may provide a 
useful exploration of the processes through which these experiences arise.  At 
present, the intimate needs of these populations are neglected in the clinical 
literature; further research will provide a framework through which these needs 
can be understood and worked with at a clinical level. 
 
A note should also be made about the viability of further research on this topic.  
Recruitment for the present research was slow and labour intensive, requiring 
nearly six months to obtain a relatively small sample, despite minimally restrictive 
inclusion criteria being employed.  While, at one level, this may be indicative that 
the populations from which participants are drawn may be relatively small, it also 
likely illustrates the difficulty of engaging participants with a diagnosis in intensive 
qualitative research.  As the development of NHS services for autistic adults 
expands in the wake of the Autism Act (2009), clinical services may form a more 
viable route for recruitment of this difficult to reach population.  Alternatively, 
some compromise of homogeneity might be accepted and participants recruited 
from across the English speaking world, although consideration would have to be 
given to whether the diagnostic practices involved in meeting the inclusion criteria 
are variable across countries, as appears likely.  Difficulties with recruitment may 
be less pronounced for quantitative approaches using online interfaces, which 
involve less direct and less intensive interpersonal demands. 
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4.3 Critical Review 
4.3.1 Validity 
The present study aims to provide a hermeneutic framework for the research’s 
audience.  The phenomenological understanding of “truth” is quite distinct from a 
naive correspondence theory – truth consists in disclosure: “To say that a 
statement is true means that it discovers the beings in themselves.  It asserts, it 
shows, it lets beings “be seen” in their discoveredness.  The being true (truth) of 
a statement must be understood as discovering.” (Heidegger, 1996, p.201)  All 
understanding of the world is interpretation from an engaged position of 
openness to discovery.  As such, the quality of the present project may be chiefly 
assessed in terms of what Spencer and Ritchie (2011) refer to as the criterion of 
contribution: the extent to which it facilitates the reader’s interpretation of the 
phenomenon of concern.  I have argued above that the analysis given here 
provides new perspectives on a topic which has so far received little attention in 
research, and is based on a thorough analysis of the data. 
 
A potential limitation to the validity of the findings concerns the quality of the 
primary data on which the analysis is based.  As discussed in the Introduction, 
current cognitive models of autism propose that the condition involves deficits in 
the self-awareness upon which phenomenological approaches rely (Frith & 
Happe, 1999).  Furthermore, Willig (2008) argues that interpretative 
phenomenological analysis requires participants to demonstrate a high degree of 
articulacy and reflective ability.  The validity of phenomenological research using 
the accounts of individuals diagnosed as autistic may thus be called into 
question.  However, I would argue that these objections are based upon 
premises at odds with the hermeneutic underpinnings of IPA.  Implicit in either 
argument is the assumption that the account provided within an interview 
constitutes a means for accessing inner experience which can be of greater or 
lesser communicative quality.  However, a hermeneutic phenomenology would 
suggest that experience is always already manifest as an interpretation; the 
veracity or complexity of the accounts given is beside the point.  Where 
participants’ accounts seem removed from the sophisticated complexity of 
philosophical phenomenological texts, this can be argued to simply be a 
reflection of the nature of the experience for the individual, which may be less 
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characterised by detailed introspection and attention to the nuances of 
phenomena.  In any case, the current analysis reveals comparable thematic 
depth in the accounts of diagnosed and undiagnosed participants, arguing in 
favour of the validity of a phenomenological approach with individuals diagnosed 
with ASD. 
 
Nonetheless, one substantial concern can be raised concerning the production of 
and approach to the “primary data” upon which this research is based.  In 
approaching the interview process, I accepted that it already constituted a stage 
of interpretation.  Considering this, my practical strategy was to keep my 
questions as open as possible, refraining from using terms or probes which might 
detract from participants’ framing of their accounts in their own language.  The 
underlying assumption was that this would help to ensure that the accounts 
provided were genuinely representative of the lived experiences they described.  
Therefore, where differences then emerged in thematic content and priority – 
such as the differential priorities given to closeness as “validation of the self” 
versus “sharing of experience” - this was interpreted as being reflective of 
qualitative differences in participants’ lived experiences.  However, the strategy of 
avoiding the introduction of my own interpretations within the interview also 
precludes the active pursuit of disconfirmation.  The possibility remains that 
variables within the interview setting itself – such as the participants’ ease with 
the setting, or specific agendas which they might have brought to the interview 
themselves – rather than differences in the quality of their experiences, may have 
influenced the accounts given.  I am left wondering what the responses of the 
participants would have been had I in some way asked questions concerning 
these themes to those whose accounts did not originally feature them.  Implicitly, 
the approach adopted also retains a stance towards the interview transcripts as 
essentially “raw data”, which is somewhat at odds with the hermeneutic 
foundation of the study. 
 
An alternative approach that could have been adopted would be, instead, to 
embrace the hermeneutic dimension of the interview setting, approaching it as an 
opportunity for negotiating understanding with participants in a dialogical, or even 
Socratic, fashion.  Such an approach is suggested by van Manen (1990), and 
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termed by Dinkins (as cited in Roulston, 2010) as a process of “interpre-view”.  
Interpretations could be brought out in the questioning process, which itself could 
be conducted over two or more meetings.  One concern about this approach 
would be that the Socratic interrogation of experience could expose aspects of 
participants’ accounts with which they might be uncomfortable, leading to a 
defensive concealment, rather than disclosure of experience; alternatively, the 
interview itself might come to be guided by the interviewers’ concerns.  However, 
as well as being consistent with a recognition of the interview as a process of 
interpretation in and of itself, such an approach would hold the advantage of 
negotiating understanding in a more collaborative fashion than the present study. 
 
4.3.2 Limitations 
As a phenomenological project, the present research does not address objective 
intersubjective processes, such as “practical” ways in which partners establish 
closeness in the context of a diagnosis of ASD, nor the types of difficulties that 
may be present.  The findings address only subjective experiences; no attempt 
has been made to synthesise the findings to produce a dyadic and dynamic 
model of closeness as a process.  Rather, what this study aims to provide is an 
understanding of the way in which partners make sense of their experiences of 
closeness, and aids and obstacles to establishing it, which may provide an 
interpretative framework for clinical work with individuals from these populations, 
and for future research which may seek to explore empirically questions that this 
research does not address.   
 
A further question which is not fully addressed in this study, nor, so far as I have 
been able to identify, within the wider research on closeness, is the juxtaposition 
of experiences of closeness to desire.  References were made by participants to 
desire and “want”, as I have sought to bring out in the analysis, and, in particular 
for the diagnosed participants, the experience of being desired was essential to 
the experience of closeness.  What merits further consideration in future research 
is the relative phenomenological meanings and interplay of desire and closeness.  
What is the experience of desire, what are the conditions of its phenomenology, 
and how does it relate to a sense of being close to a partner?   
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My own tentative reading of the present participants’ accounts suggests that the 
partner’s desire becomes phenomenologically central within the process of the 
revelation of the authentic self before the other, such that the subjective sense of 
self becomes identified with the self objectified in the other’s intentionality, and 
the very sense of the self becomes contingent on the partner’s desiring response.  
(Intriguingly, this theme seems more present in the accounts of the diagnosed 
participants.)  Nonetheless, desire did not emerge as a central theme in its own 
right in the findings.  This may be partially due to practical issues – desire was 
not addressed in the research or interview questions, nor actively sought out in 
the analysis.  However, the latency of the desire in participants’ accounts of 
closeness may also implicate limitations in what language is able to signify.  
Lacan (as interpreted by Fink, 1997), perhaps the last century’s foremost thinker 
on the desire of the Other, argued that, while the very essence of language is 
bound up in the question of the desire of the Other, as an object of perception, 
the Other’s desire eludes signification.  An empirical phenomenological 
investigation of the experience of a partner’s desire may therefore require closer 
attention to the form and structure of participants’ accounts, rather than the 
semantic content which is generally made the focus of IPA. 
 
Finally, while no claims are being made regarding the generalisability of the 
present analysis, the restricted nature of the sample is, nonetheless, a notable 
limitation.  In terms of culture and ethnicity, the participants were all British born.  
As a central aim of the study was an exploration of the central experiential 
dimensions of closeness, the inclusion of a broader sample may have yielded 
greater depth in the exploration of commonality and diversity in the data.  More 
profoundly, the homogeneity of the sample occludes important issues regarding 
socially constructed dimensions of closeness, which need to be acknowledged 
and explored even within a phenomenological framework.  The sample gathered 
is also overwhelmingly female.  The relationship between autism and gender is 
one requiring further exploration, both in view of the gender imbalance in 
diagnosis and the currency of the “extreme male brain” hypothesis (Baron-
Cohen, 2002).  The small sample precludes any inference about the possible 
significance of the gender imbalance among those recruited, but it would be 
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interesting to explore in population-level quantitative research whether females 
diagnosed with AS have greater success at sustaining romantic relationships. 
 
4.3.3 Reflexivity 
In returning to the consideration of the reflexive aspects of this work, my aim is to 
consider the implications of the way in which my own understandings of 
closeness and autism have influenced the analysis.  As I have already argued, 
from a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, reflexivity is a condition of all 
understanding; the reflexive element of qualitative research is of value in so far 
as it discloses a way of understanding the phenomena which is accessible and of 
utility to the reader’s own interpretative positioning.  The challenge is to 
demonstrate a dialogical position towards the data through which discovery, 
rather than dogmatism, emerges. 
 
In the second chapter, I stated that my understanding of closeness centred on a 
deep sharing of experiences, such that an experience is felt to have been given, 
or understood, in deeply resonant ways by either partner.  Furthermore, my 
longstanding understanding of autism has been that it represents a fundamentally 
different mode of experiencing the world and intersubjectivity, and I have found 
the “mindblindness” hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 1997) a useful framework for 
understanding autism.  As such, I approached the research with an expectation 
that “closeness” might, within an autistic mode of experience, signify a 
qualitatively different experience than for non-diagnosed participants; 
alternatively, I expected that they might describe difficulties in understanding the 
concept. 
 
Revisiting the analysis, the establishment of a common dimension of closeness – 
authenticity – may in part reflect an effort not to allow my own given 
understanding of the construct to dominate the findings.  Nonetheless, the 
sharing of experience, so central to my own understandings, emerges as a 
central subordinate theme.  Moreover, autism does emerge as a locus for a 
different understanding of closeness from my own.  This may appear suspiciously 
congruent with my initial positioning relative to the constructs.  Has my 
interpretation been restricted by my given understandings?  In favour of the 
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validity of the interpretation, I would respond that I was aware over the course of 
the collection of data of the congruence between my developing understanding, 
even prior to formal analysis.  For example, within latter interviews, I sought to 
explore, through non-leading probes, potential exemplars of the sharing of 
experience in the diagnosed participants’ accounts.  Furthermore, as reflexivity is 
inevitable and essential to all human understanding, the fact that alternative 
interpretations are possible does not diminish the validity of an analysis.  Rather, 
the potential for alternative readings may even be celebrated as an opportunity 
for further discovery and exploration. 
 
The findings of the analysis, as well as shifts in my own understanding of the 
phenomena, also give evidence that a dialogical approach towards the data has 
been taken.  The emergence of “closeness as authenticity” as the foremost 
dominant theme was a surprise to me, reached slowly through laborious repeated 
readings and analyses of the data.  Furthermore, I was impressed to find that 
issues of social comprehension did not constitute a central thematic dimension of 
the experiences of diagnosed participants, despite my own preconception that it 
should, and that the commonalities between the understandings of diagnosed 
and undiagnosed participants were as significant as differences, if not more so.  
The analysis, furthermore, disclosed to myself new understandings of closeness 
and autism.  Through the course of this research, I have come to perceive the 
importance within my own relationships of being able to openly express my “inner 
experiences” and “dispositions” – that is, I have come to understand authenticity 
as an important aspect of closeness in my own life.  Furthermore, I have become 
increasingly aware that, for all the importance of experimental research into 
autistic difference, there remains a paradigmatic distinction between cognitive 
and qualitative approaches to the experiences of those diagnosed autistic, such 
that assumptions cannot be made about the latter on the basis of the former.  
These shifts in my own understandings, and the demonstrable difference 
between the findings of the analysis and my initial positioning, argue strongly that 
the analysis has been based on a suitably dialogical approach to the data. 
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4.3.4 Reading Critically 
Language constitutes, inevitably, the medium through which this investigation is 
undertaken; the research question itself centres upon the relation between 
experience and two key signifiers, “autism” and “closeness”.  Yet, the nature of 
the research question and analysis is phenomenological, seeking to explore 
“lived experience”.  An assumption is thus implicit within the approach that 
language constitutes a system of signification which corresponds 
unproblematically with phenomena and makes the participant’s account readily 
interpretable.  Language is a servant, rather than master, of experience. 
 
However, these claims are challenged by poststructural theory.  Most 
significantly, Derrida (1973) levelled a forceful critique at the conceptual 
foundations of phenomenology.  The signifier, for Derrida, acts as a supplier of 
the signified; it runs ahead of it.  Yet, Western tradition, exemplified by classical 
phenomenology, is predicated upon the idea of the signifier as simply “tagged 
onto” the object.  If the objects of experience are themselves produced through 
signification, then the claims of phenomenology to be an exploration of 
experiences manifestly present prior to the language used to describe them are, 
according to the terms of poststructuralist theory, undermined.  Indeed, Derrida’s 
critique proved ultimately fatal to phenomenology as a movement (Moran, 2000).  
It can be argued that phenomenology still constitutes a valid mode of inquiry, 
provided the epoche is taken to apply to experience as given, which is almost 
always through the medium of acquired significations (Rodemeyer, 2008).  Yet, if 
language remains the inevitable medium of research and communication, 
profound questions are raised about the claims that can be made for what 
research discloses. 
 
A critical reading of the present research, informed by Derridian critique, would 
understand that what is represented in the analysis is first and foremost text, a 
complex of language that cannot claim to “signify” the experiences of participants.  
This does not diminish the value of the reading; phenomenological analysis can 
still constitute a valuable hermeneutic tool which will be understood and 
employed by the reader in any number of ways which may facilitate a multiplicity 
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of interpretations of further research and clinical encounters.  What are at stake 
are simply the claims that are made for what the work “represents”. 
 
I am not happy, however, to abandon the phenomenological claims of the present 
project – while the critique precludes a naive claim that even the clearest of 
communication suffices to convey experience straightforwardly, I feel that the 
disclosure, if not construction, of phenomena remains a central function of 
language.  Nonetheless, if the concerns of poststructural theory are taken 
seriously, as I believe they must be, analytical questions are raised not 
addressed in the present work.  A fully critical reading would seek to explore what 
the data discloses about the participants’ experiences, but, moreover, how the 
dominant discourses within language structure not only participants’ accounts 
within the interview, but also the experiences themselves.  How do participants 
engage within the interview with “closeness” and “autism” as social constructs?  
Moreover, how do the discourses associated with these terms structure lived 
experience?  And is it possible to explore the participants’ experience of the 
signifier itself?  “Closeness” and “autism” are not value free terms giving simple 
expression to experience: they are vehicles for social ideals, in relation to which 
an individual cannot position themselves without concern for the social 
ramifications of their discourse. 
 
IPA has been argued to be a valid methodology for the exploration of the 
interface of lived experience and social discourse.  Eatough and Smith (2006) 
have provided an exemplary idiographic exploration of the complex relationship 
between discourse and the hermeneutics of experience within the paradigm of 
IPA through an idiographic analysis of a participant’s account of anger.  However, 
the project for a critical phenomenology raises profound conceptual issues which 
have not yet been adequately addressed in the literature – indeed, the standard 
textbook on IPA (Smith et al., 2009) gives no consideration to issues of social 
construction.  This remains an area in need of further theoretical refinement.  
With the development of a more robust critically informed interpretative 
framework, phenomenological research may further the causes which motivate 
the present study: to give priority within writing to the experiences and values of 
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autistic individuals and those close to them, towards allowing for the proper 
emergence of autistic presence. 
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5. Conclusions 
The research uncovered three core thematic dimensions in the experience of 
closeness for eight participants in romantic relationships in which one partner had 
a diagnosis of ASD: closeness as authenticity, discovering the partner, and 
autism as an essential difference.  Emergent subordinate themes revealed 
certain distinctions in the experiences of diagnosed and undiagnosed 
participants, but commonalities were as salient as differences.  A central 
requirement for the mutual experience of closeness is that both partners feel that 
they are fully understood, accepted, and responded to by their partners in an 
attuned fashion.  Differing personal needs of either partner can pose both 
challenges and opportunities.  The findings of the analysis suggest ways in which 
existing approaches to clinical work with individuals with autism as well as 
couples in which one partner has a diagnosis can be adapted to address the 
needs of people in this type of relationship when they are facing difficulties in 
establishing closeness.   
 
The findings show some concordance with dominant approaches to autism and 
closeness, but also demonstrate the limitations of dominant paradigms in 
understanding lived experience.  Research into autism, as well as closeness, 
overwhelmingly adopts quantitative methodologies in order to establish causal 
models of the constructs.  This study demonstrates the way in which qualitative 
approaches may provide a distinct contribution, allowing the experiences of 
autistic individuals and those close to them to be heard and understood in their 
own right.   
 
The romantic experiences of people with autism and their partners is an area in 
urgent need of further research.  Large scale quantitative studies are required to 
determine the scale need at a population level, and establish the correlates of 
different outcomes.  However, qualitative research is required to give meaning to 
future research in terms of the values and lived experiences of these groups.  It is 
hoped that the present study will make a distinct contribution towards this end, 
and will be an initial step towards building a greater understanding of this area.  
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Appendix B: Exemplar Recruitment E-Mail 
 
Dear -----, 
 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist in London and am carrying out research, as 
part of my doctorate, on romantic relationships in which one of the partners has a 
diagnosis of an Autism Spectrum Disorder (including Asperger’s Syndrome). I am 
writing to ask whether any members of your organisation, or those you support, 
might be interested either in taking part or passing on information about the 
research project. 
 
The research concerns ways in which people with ASD and their partners 
experience closeness in their relationships. For the research, I aim to interview 
both people with the diagnosis and 'neuro-typical' individuals in a relationship with 
someone with ASD about their experiences, although I am planning at this stage 
to only interview one person from any couple.  
 
At present, very little research has been carried out regarding romantic 
relationships in which one or both partners is affected by ASD. I therefore hope, 
through the project, to develop within the clinical and research communities a 
greater understanding of the values, experiences, and needs of people with ASD 
and their partners. 
 
I have attached an information sheet giving basic information on the research for 
anyone interested. If anyone is interested in participating, or is curious about 
knowing more about the research, they can contact me by e-mail at 
u0933897@uel.ac.uk, and I will be happy to provide further details. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Joe Schwaerzler 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of East London 
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Appendix C: Application Letter for Amendments of Recruitment Procedure 
 
       Josef Schwaerzler 
       46 Chilver Street 
       Greenwich 
       London SE10 0RH 
 
Dr. Mark Finn 
Ethics Board Chair 
School of Psychology 
University of East London 
Water Lane, Stratford  E15 4LZ 
 
22nd August, 2011  
 
Dear Mark, 
 
RE: Ethical Approval for Clinical Doctorate Thesis Research – “Autism and 
the Experience of Closeness” 
 
I am writing to request to make amendments to the recruitment procedure for my 
research outlined in my original ethics proposal. 
 
The original proposal states (page 2, Item 9) that I will recruit for the study 
“through the National Autistic Society, as well as networks used by affected 
individuals, including support groups and online forums.”  I have been in the 
process of recruiting through these avenues, but feel that the process of 
recruitment would be significantly aided by pursuing additional possibilities.  I will 
not be contacting potential participants directly, but want to create additional 
avenues for recruitment. 
 
I am therefore requesting approval to send information about the study, including 
the approved information sheets, for recruitment purposes to the following groups 
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to ask them to disseminate information about the project to people they know 
who meet the criteria and might be interested in taking part: 
 
1. Personal contacts, including colleagues and friends, who may themselves 
know individuals who meet the inclusion criteria for the study, and to whom 
they could in turn send the information.  I would not include in the study 
any existing personal acquaintances. 
2. Institutions, such as university departments or private companies, that may 
have among their members, students, or employees, individuals who meet 
the inclusion criteria. 
3. Individuals meeting the inclusion criteria who have put this information 
about themselves in the public domain (e.g. through published books or 
internet postings).  In sending information to these individuals, I will not 
invite them directly to take part, but will, rather, ask if they are able to send 
the information to interested parties.  I would, however, accept any 
responses from the individuals I have contacted expressing an interest in 
taking part. 
 
I would also like to request permission to establish a website with basic 
information about the research, through which potential participants could learn 
about the project and contact me for further details. 
 
I understand that as Chair of the School of Psychology Ethics Committee you 
may be able to approve these changes by Chair’s action.  Alternatively, there 
may be further information or school processes required.  Please let me know 
whether it is possible for you to approve these changes, and if so, whether any or 
all of these amendments is approved, or if they might be approved subject to 
revision. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Josef Schwaerzler 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
2009-2012 Cohort  
 108 
 
Appendix D: E-mail Confirming Approval of Amendment to Recruitment 
Procedure 
 
From:   Mark Finn  
 
To:   Josef SCHWAERZLER  
 
Cc:    
 
Subject:   RE: Clinical Doctorate Thesis - Request to Amend Procedure 
Attachments:  
 
Sent:  Fri 26/08/2011 11:40 
 
Dear Josef,  
   
Thank you for your email.  
   
I have considered your proposed amendments in relation to recruitment and am 
happy to unconditionally approve these.  
   
While you don’t raise this directly, if you at any stage post recruitment adds on 
websites, it will be necessary to have approval from the website manager first.  
   
Please consider this email confirmation of the approval.  
   
Best wishes,  
   
Mark 
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Appendix E: Interview Schedule 
 
1. Please tell me some details about your relationship. 
Prompts: How long have you been with your partner?  Living 
together/married?  If not, how often do you see your partner?  Children?  
How long have you known about your (partner’s) diagnosis?  How was this 
found out?  Understanding of diagnosis? 
 
2. What does “closeness” mean to you? 
Possible prompts:  What do you understand by the word “closeness”?  How 
significant is it to you?   
 
3. In what ways do you experience closeness in your relationship? 
Possible prompts: At what times do you feel close to your partner?  What 
allows you to be close at these times?  What is it that you experience when 
you feel close with your partner?  Are there any difficulties in establishing 
closeness? 
 
4. Can you describe an experience in which you have felt close to your partner? 
Possible prompts as per question 3. 
 
5. What do you think “closeness” means to your partner? 
Possible prompts as per question 2. 
 
6. How do you think your partner experiences closeness in your relationship? 
Possible prompts as per question 3. 
 
7. How important is closeness in your relationship? 
Possible prompts: To you?  To your partner?  What else is important?   
 
8. In what ways, if any, does ASD/Autism/AS affect closeness in your 
relationship? 
Possible prompts: For you?  For your partner?  Positve and/or negative 
aspects?  Differences in experience you attribute to presence of ASD?  
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Appendix F: Research Information Sheet 
 
Josef Schwaerzler 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of East London 
Stratford, London  E15 4LZ 
U0933897@uel.ac.uk 
 
 
Autism and the Experience of Closeness 
You are invited to take part in a research study exploring the experiences of 
closeness in romantic relationships in which one partner is diagnosed with an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD, including Autism and Asperger Syndrome).  
Before deciding whether you wish to participate in the study, it is important that 
you understand why the study is being done, and what it involves.  Please, 
therefore, take the time to read through this information sheet before deciding 
whether you wish to take part. 
 
Who is carrying out the research? 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of East London.  The 
research is supervised by a Clinical Psychologist, also based at University of 
East London. 
 
Why is the research important? 
People with a diagnosis of ASD may feel intimate relationships to be very 
important to them, and develop romantic relationships with others without a 
diagnosis of ASD.  However, little research has yet been done into relationships 
developed by individuals diagnosed with ASD.  The research will seek to explore 
how people in relationships in which one partner has a diagnosis of ASD 
experience closeness within these relationships. 
 
By taking part in this study, you will be aiding the development of an 
understanding of issues that are of importance to individuals with ASD diagnoses 
and people in relationships with them.  This information may produce greater 
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understanding of the experiences of individuals with ASD and their partners, and 
highlight issues of which others need to be aware when close to or supporting 
people with ASD or their romantic partners. 
 
Who is being asked to take part? 
For this study, I am looking to recruit: 
 
a) Adults who have been formally diagnosed with ASD for more than 1 year 
previous to taking part in the study, who do not have a diagnosed learning 
disability, and are, at the time of taking part in the study, in romantic 
relationships with individuals who do not have diagnoses of ASD.   
b) Adults without diagnoses of ASD who are in romantic relationships with 
individuals who do have ASD diagnoses, who have been aware of their 
partners’ diagnosis for more than 1 year, and whose partners do not have 
a diagnosed learning disability. 
 
At present, I am only looking to recruit one partner from any couple.  Your partner 
does not have to give consent for you to participate.  However, for anyone taking 
part, it is important that you are committed to your relationship (that you are not 
currently thinking of ending the relationship) and have been with your partner for 
at least 1 year at the time of taking part in the study.   
 
What does taking part involve? 
If you agree to take part, I will meet with you for an interview about your 
experiences of closeness within your relationship.  The interview will last 
approximately an hour.  I will record the interview on a digital recording device for 
later transcription.   
 
I am able to book a room for the interview at the University of East London.  
Alternatively, I can meet with you at your home or another private location to 
which you have access.  I am able to travel to locations within two hours’ 
commuting time from central London, but unfortunately can not travel further do 
to time restrictions.  I will be able to reimburse any travel expenses incurred for 
your travel to the interview. 
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Alternatively, should you not wish to meet for an interview, or should you live a 
significant distance from London, it is possible to conduct an interview over the 
telephone or via Skype, or through e-mail. 
 
What will happen to the data from the interview? 
All your details and responses will be kept highly confidential, and will only be 
seen by myself and my supervisor.  The recording of the interview will be deleted 
after transcription.  When the data has been transcribed, it will be anonymised, 
with names and any other identifying details (such as areas of residence, place of 
work, etc.) regarding you, or others discussed in the interview, altered. 
 
After the information has been transcribed, it will be used in the writing of a report 
on the research, which will be submitted to the university.  The data may also be 
used in papers to be submitted to academic journals or presented at academic 
conferences.  Within the report and potential papers or conferences, excerpts 
from the anonymised transcripts will be included. 
 
As with any piece of research, if information is disclosed which clearly shows that 
you or someone else is at significant risk or harm, confidentiality could not be 
maintained, and I would be obliged to discuss these issues with your GP or 
appropriate services.  I would try to first discuss this with yourself. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  Participation in this study is entirely up to you.  If you agree to take part, you 
will have the right to cancel or withdraw from the interview, and to withdraw from 
the study entirely at any time, in which case your responses would not be used in 
the study.  If you decide to withdraw from the research, you do not need to give 
any reason for this. 
 
What are the potential benefits and risks from taking part? 
Many people find that they enjoy talking about experiences that are significant to 
them.  Your participation in this research may give you satisfaction for having 
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contributed to the development of knowledge which may be of benefit to 
individuals with ASD diagnoses and their partners.   
 
Some individuals may find it difficult to talk about these experiences.  If you 
experience distress during the interview, you will, if you wish, be able to decline 
to talk about difficult topics, or to withdraw from the interview, without stating a 
reason.  If your responses suggest that you are experiencing significant distress, 
I will suggest you speak to your GP or another professional from whom you might 
receive support. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed and approved by the University of East London 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Contacts for Further Information 
For further information about the study, you may contact myself, using the details 
given on the first page.  Alternatively, should you wish to speak to my supervisor, 
please contact: 
• Dr. Maria Castro, Clinical Tutor, Department of Clinical Psychology, 
University of East London, Stratford Campus, E15 4LZ.  Tel: 020 8223 
4409.  E-mail: r.vesey@uel.ac.uk 
 
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of the programme in which you are 
being asked to participate, please contact the Chair of the Psychology School 
Ethics Committee: 
• Dr. Amanda Roberts, School of Psychology, University of East London, 
Stratford Campus, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ  
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Appendix G: Consent Form 
 
Josef Schwaerzler 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of East London 
Stratford, London  E15 4LZ 
U0933897@uel.ac.uk 
 
Autism and the Experience of Closeness 
 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Before participating in the research, please confirm the following (tick boxes as 
appropriate: 
 
 
1. I have read the information sheet and understand the purpose of 
the study, and understand what I will be asked to do as a 
participant. 
 
2. Any questions that I may have had have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
3. I understand that I am free to withdraw myself and my data from 
the research at any time without stating a reason, and understand 
that there will be no adverse consequences for me doing so. 
 
4. I understand that my personal details will be kept strictly 
confidential, and will not be distributed in a way that could 
potentially be used to identify me, except in the event that a failure 
by the researcher to pass on information shared would pose a 
significant risk to myself or someone else. 
 
5. I consent to participate in the study as outlined in the information 
sheet. 
 
Participant’s Signature: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Participant’s Name (please print): ____________________________________ 
 
 
Researcher’s Signature: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Researcher’s Name: ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: ____________________  
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Appendix H: Extract from Research Diary 
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Appendix I: Extract of Annotated Transcript for Participant One (Emma) 
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Appendix J: Extract from Compilation List of Instances of Emergent 
Themes4 for Participant One (Emma) 
 
1. Closeness as “being able...”: 10.14-221, 18.5-6, 22.5-6 
 
2. Closeness as sharing experiences: 10.14-21(*), 18.3-7, 20.3-4, 22.6, 27.18-19 
 
3. Closeness as exclusive: 10.18-19, 19.13-15 
 
4. Closeness as “way in”: 12.6-7, 20.17-23(*), 33.2-4 
 
5. Withdrawal as threatening: 12.20-22 
 
6. Closeness as frightening for partner: 11.10-11 
 
7. Closeness & Humour: 13.11-22, 13.24-26 
 
8. Closeness as congruence in world: 13.11-22 (other known), 13.24-26(*), 
20.17-23 
 
9. Knowledge of other misleading: 13.24-14.1, 14.10-13, 14.15-17, 14.10-11, 
21.6-8 
 
10. Appearance vs underlying self: 14.1-2, 14.11-13(*), 21.6-8, 28.7-11 
 
11. Closeness requires authenticity: 15.23, 16.2-3, 18.10-12 
 
12. Loss of closeness as loss of self: 16.2-9, 17.18-19 
 
13. Self-restriction “unhealthy”: 18.1-4 
 
14. Closeness as natural, human: 19.4  
                                            
4	  Numbers	  following	  themes	  indicate	  page	  and	  line	  numbers;	  bracketed	  asterisks	  denote	  useful	  illustrative	  
quotations.	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Appendix K: Fragment of Original Thematic Map for Participant One 
(Emma)5 
 
 
                                            
5	  As	  laid	  out	  on	  the	  author’s	  study	  floorspace.	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Appendix L: Final Thematic Analysis for Participant One (Emma) 
 
Closeness as Authenticity and Need 
Closeness as Need 
Closeness as “Being Able” 
Closeness as Natural, Human 
Loss of Closeness as Loss of Self 
 
Closeness As Sharing Experience 
Communication as essential to self 
Closeness as sharing experiences (talking) 
Closeness as congruent experience of world 
Closeness and humour 
 
Experiencing the Other 
Fantasising the other 
 
Other as Present and Known 
Closeness as Exclusive 
Closeness and “Way In” 
Closeness Requires authenticity in other 
 
Other as unknown / absent 
Nature vs Choice of other 
Knowledge of other misleading 
Appearance vs Underlying Self 
 
Freedom Questioned 
Limits of Self and Other 
Choice Problematised 
Self-restriction unhealthy 
 
Different Meanings of Closeness 
Closeness as Being Needed (Other) 
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Physical Contact as Closeness (Other) 
 
AS as Non-Communication 
Communication problems (verbal exchange, comprehension) 
 
Closeness Precluded by Difference 
Relationship is not close 
Problem as difference, not ASD 
Current relationship defies held meaning of closeness 
Doing alongside vs sharing 
Partner resists closeness / closeness is frightening for other 
Partner does not share emotionally 
Impasse in desire for closeness 
 
Other becomes Lost 
Anxiety as barrier 
Partner “mirrors” emotions 
Revelation of the other becomes dramatic 
Testing the partner 
 
Diagnosis and Reinterpretations 
Diagnosis provides framework for re-interpreting 
Diagnosis as explanation and vindication of self 
AS behaviour appears as thoughtless 
AS as unsettling expectations 
Diagnosis as “something wrong” 
 
Maintaining Hope 
Relationship as a work in progress 
“Skills” for solving problems 
 
Living in a “Mad World” 
Adjusting the Self 
Self invested with responsibility and power 
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Self as frightening to other 
Acting as interpreter 
Monitoring the self 
Avoiding emotional self expression 
Finding other sources for needs 
Avoiding thought 
Choice problematic 
Closeness Deferred 
Sadness 
 
Struggle can produce authenticity 
 
 
 
